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INTRODUCTION

Standard form contracts have been in use for over two centuries,
and the question of the proper construction of these contracts has
haunted contract law ever since. Form contracts were first used in the
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A. 1976, Hampshire
College; J.D. 1979, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Professor E.
Allan Farnsworth for graciously reading this Article in manuscript form. I would also like to
thank both Emily R. Greenberg, Law Libary Director at the University of Baltimore School of
Law, and Morris L. Cohen, former Law Librarian and Professor at Yale Law School, for
helping track down the full text of Professor Llewellyn's unpublished draft of his proposed
1941 revision of the Uniform Sales Act. Finally, I want to acknowledge that funding for this
article came from the University of Baltimore School of Law's Summer Research Fund. Of
course, all opinions expressed and mistakes made are my own.
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latter half of the eighteenth century for marine insurance.I The insurance companies' reliance on forms marked a radical departure from
the traditional negotiated contract:
No longer do individuals bargain for this or that provision in the
contract ....

The control of the wording of those contracts has

passed into the hands of the concern, and the drafting into the
hands of its legal advisor .... In the trades affected it is henceforth
futile for an individual to attempt any modification, and incorrect
for the economist and lawyer to classify or judge such arrangements as standing on an equal footing with individual agreements. 2
In the contemporary debate, some economists and lawyers continue to equate form contracts with the negotiated, "individual contracts." 3 Other commentators, however, recognize that consumer
form contracts create special risks and problems.' These difficulties
have been attributed, with varying emphases, to unequal bargaining
power, to the failure to negotiate the contract terms, to the "take-itor-leave-it" basis of the transaction, and to the fact that inevitably
most terms remain unread.'
1. CTro PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN
ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 11(1937). This book was the subject of Karl Llewellyn's
famous 1939 book review, in which he first detailed his own view of form contracts. See K.N.
Llewellyr, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REV. 700 (1939); see infra text accompanying note 78.
2. PRAUSNITZ, supra note 1, at 18 ("It is the freedom of contract theory pushed to its
extreme, thus reaching its climax and resulting in fetters to one of the parties concerned.").
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 84-86 (2d ed. 1977);
Stephen J. Ware, A Critiqueof the ReasonableExpectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461,
1467 (1989); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 652-55
(1979). This is not a unanimous view. For the theory that economic efficiency requires that
the consumers' objective understanding control the unread written terms, see Michael I.
Meyerson, The Efficient Form Contract: Law and Economics Meet the Real World, 24 GA. L.
REV. 583 (1990); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice
of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700 (1992).
4. The term "consumer form contract" in this context includes more than merely
contracts associated with the purchase of consumer goods and services. Many, though not all,
form contracts create similar problems concerning informed assent. See, e.g., Martin v. Joseph
Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985) (small businesspeople such as family farmers);
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971) (gas station franchisees); Matuszak
v. Houston Oilers, 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (contract presented to employees).
Accordingly, any theory purporting to resolve the problems raised by form contracts must also
cover agreements between employers and employees as well as between large and small
businessc:s, where the situation indicates to the reasonable contract drafter that the other party
has not assented to unread and unexpected terms. See, e.g., Haspel v. Rollins Protective
Service, 'Inc., 490 So. 2d 530, 533 (La. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 496 So. 2d 326 (La. 1986)
(stating that "an artificial distinction between commercial enterprises and consumers is
inappropriate ... Sophistication and educational level, not commerciality, are the primary
considerations"). Cf Addison Mueller, Contracts of Frustration,78 YALE L.J. 576, 576 n.1
(1969) (defining consumer as "a buyer of a small lot from a retailer").
5. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 23-41.
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Unfortunately, a generally accepted solution to the issue has yet
to be formulated. In 1970, Arthur Leff described the law of consumer
form contracts as "a disaster." He wrote "the consumer-purchase
transaction is still stumbling about, a diagnosed disease seeking a nos-8
7
trum." 6 Since then, contract law has died, and been resurrected,
reconstructed, 9 and transformed.' 0 Doctrines of adhesion," reasonable expectations,' 2 and unconscionability 13 have all been advanced.
Yet, the battle continues to rage.
This Article proposes a modest solution to the dilemma of form
contracts. The Article's central thesis is that confusion continues to
reign mostly because those seeking answers have searched too hard.
The conceptual difficulties stem from one fundamental error: the
common law presumption, often conclusive, that consumers who sign
form contracts are aware of, understand, and assent to the unread,
unexpected and uncontemplated terms in the form contracts. This
presumption of assent conflicts with the objective theory of contracts.
Because the drafters of these contracts know not only that their forms
will not be read, but also that it is reasonable for consumers to sign
them unstudied, a reasonable drafter should have no illusion that
there has been true assent to these terms. If the common law courts
had merely recognized the self-evident-that objectively the drafter
does not expect the consumer to learn of the contract terms-traditional contract theory would have produced logical results.
In short, courts correctly applying the objective theory to consumer form contracts will not assume automatically that there is
objective agreement to all terms merely because they have been
printed and a document has been signed. Rather, courts will try to
determine how a reasonable drafter should have understood the consumer's agreement. The critical questions will be:
6. Arthur A. Leff, Contractas Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 142 (1970). Thirteen years
later one commentator stated that "[a]lthough there is a quite general perception that different
law must be applied to contracts of adhesion, there is little agreement on what principles
should control. The currently applicable law is characterized by a lack of intelligible doctrine
and a lack of consistent results." Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1983).

7. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
8. Colin K. Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 38 (1977).
9. Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1176.
10. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts
Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1984).
11. Friedrich Kessler, Contractsof Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).

12. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions:
Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970).
13. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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1) What terms would a seller reasonably expect were known and
understood by the non-drafting party?
2) What subordinate terms were pointed out or explained by the
seller?
3) What would the reasonable seller have assumed was the consumer's purpose in entering into the transaction?
4) Is a clause favoring the drafter reasonably tailored to accomplish a legitimate purpose?
5) Was information conveyed by the seller, either directly, by an
agent or by advertisements, to create a reasonable expectation in
the consumer?
6) Did the consumer communicate to the seller information indicating a particular understanding of the terms of the contract?
7) Does an unknown one-sided clause deal with issues beyond the
realm of contemplation of the reasonable consumer at the time of
contracting?
These questions focus attention on how a reasonable drafter
should understand the assent of a consumer. This analysis does not
automatically favor either the drafter or the consumer, but attempts
to give both parties full freedom to contract together. It also may help
bring the law of form contracts back into the mainstream of general
contract law.
II.

THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS

In the ancient past, contracts required a "meeting of the minds"
to be legally recognized.1 4 It is now settled that no actual meeting of
minds or subjective agreement is necessary, most obviously because
the mind of a human is unknown and unknowable for the rest of the
world. 15 A person's true feelings are secret; the existence of heart-felt

agreement is forever uncertain.
Accordingly, the common law courts shifted their focus to a version of "objective reality."

The true motivations and feelings of the

contracting parties became irrelevant.' 6 Instead, all that mattered
was how words and actions would be understood by a reasonable
14. E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943-44
(1967).
15. See generally MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860 200 (1977) (The subjective theory "had the drastic limitation of making legal
certainty and predictability impossible. Once contractual obligation was founded entirely on
an arbitrary 'meeting of minds,' it endowed the parties with a complete power to remake
law.").
16. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1920) ("In the formation
of contrccts it was long ago settled that secret intent was immaterial; only overt acts being

considered in the determination of such mutual assent as that branch of law requires.").
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recipient of information. As Judge Learned Hand stated: "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." 1 7
To determine if A has made a legally enforceable promise to B,
one must determine whether B "had reason to believe that the first
party had that intention."'" The intent of a speaker or writer is
inferred from the perspective of what the listener or reader knew or

should have known.' 9
Thus, if owners of property write and sign a piece of paper stating, "We hereby agree to sell to W.O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for $50,000, title satisfactory to buyer," a court can confidently
find an intent to sell.20 Similarly, if Lucy reads and accepts the document, the court may infer an intent to purchase the Ferguson Farm.
This is a straightforward application of the rule that "[t]he law
imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable
meaning of his words and acts."'"
Thus, traditionally there has been a so-called duty to read, which
binds those who sign or accept a contract to the written terms even if

they did not read or understand its content.22 In cases involving
negotiated contracts or experienced businesspeople, this duty to read
is consistent with the objective theory because assent can reasonably
be inferred from the act of signing a document in such circumstances.

One expects the average businessperson to be able to learn the mean17. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), afl'd, 201 F. 664
(2nd Cir. 1912), affid, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
18. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 114 (1982). This rule governs transactions
under the U.C.C. as well as the common law; see, e.g., City of Everett v. Estate of Sumstad,
614 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), affid in part, rev'd in part, 631 P.2d 366 (Wash.
1981). See generally U.C.C. § 1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law ... relative to capacity to contract,
principle and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy,
or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."); see also Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Say. & Loan, 804 F.2d 1487, 1495 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Judges
have a duty to consider the equities of a case unless equitable principles have been displaced,
and nothing short of an express code provision . . . demonstrates displacement.") (citations
omitted).
19. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 26 (3d ed.
1987).
20. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1954).
21. Id. at 521 (quoting First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770
(Va. 1937)).
22. For a discussion of the evolution of the duty to read doctrine, see John D. Calamari,
Duty to Read: A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974).
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ing of the contract terms with relative ease and to voice any disagreement with such terms.
There are, however, circumstances where the significance of the
same act is quite different. The law has long recognized that unsuspecting recipients of parcel room checks or ticket stubs do not accept,
and thus are not bound by, the printed limitations on liability. 23 This
principle, too, is consistent with the objective theory because the party
printing the ticket, knowing the fine print will not be read, does not
have a reasonable belief that the other party assented to the limitations. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in
rejecting a waiver of liability printed on the ticket to an amusement
park attraction: "[A] person of average intelligence and alertness
would be unlikely to observe it, and would enter the [ride] in the belief
that he: had all the rights of the ordinary business visitor with respect
to so much of the premises as he was invited to use." 24 The court
added that if such a limitation was to be enforceable at all, the ride's
proprietor should have "employed adequate means to bring to [the
patron's] attention the fact that his invitation was a qualified and conditional one." 25
If the objective theory of contracts were correctly applied to consumer form contracts, a similar rule would result. In our current
society, the average consumer is unlikely to observe most of the terms
in forra contracts. They may well know central terms, such as price
and quantity, but generally they neither know nor understand
subordinate terms, such as those describing recourse in case of
breach. 26 Consumers, thus, contract with a reasonable belief that they
do not relinquish the rights implied by law for the benefit of the ordinary contracting party."
23. See generally Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 217 P. 673 (Mont. 1923) (railroad
ticket); 'Healy v. N.Y.Cent. & H.R.R., Co., 138 N.Y. Supp. 287 (N.Y. 1912) (parcel room
claim check); Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 325 N.Y. Supp. 2d. 576 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1971)
(80-page auction house catalogue); McAshan v. Cavitt, 299 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. 1950) (parking
lot claim check).
24. Kushner v. McGinnis, 194 N.E. 106, 108 (Mass. 1935).
25. Id.
26. For a discussion of the differentiation between "central" and "subordinate" terms, see
George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1304-06

(1981). This differentiation is analogous to Llewellyn's distinction between a "few dickered
terms" and "boilerplate clauses." See infra text accompanying note 85.
27. This view is in harmony with the presumption that a party to a contract will not
knowingly give an unfair advantage to the other without receiving adequate compensation,
which :is another method of establishing a party's objective intent. See, e.g., Brown v.
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 269 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), motion granted, 228

N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1967), aftd, 231 N.E.2d 768 (N.Y. 1967) ("It is not to be assumed that
people act unreasonably to their own disadvantage..."); Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E.
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It is no secret that consumers neither read nor understand standard form contracts. 28 The president of a car rental company hardly
believes that renters at the airport rental counter read the front and
back of the rental contract before receiving the keys.2 9 It is equally
unrealistic to state that a reasonable rental car executive would
assume that a renter's signature reflects true assent to every term in
the contract. 30 The only basis for such a belief would be if the current
law mandates such a result despite the objective understanding of the
rental car executive. 3 ' Any expectation that the contract terms written by the company's lawyers are enforceable against the consumer is
"reasonable" not because the consumer's true intent was objectively
ascertained but solely because of the legal rule.
One reason for a contract system founded on objective criteria of
assent to ignore the reasonable interpretation of the consumer's intent
might be to affect the consumer's behavior. However, consumers do
889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) ("There will be no assumption of a purpose to visit venial
faults with oppressive retribution.").
28. See, e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 992 (Colo. 1986) (automobile rental
agent testifying that she had never seen any customer read the reverse side of the rental
agreement); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967) ("The ordinary consumer goods
purchaser more often than not does not read the fine print .... "); Holiday of Plainview, Ltd.
v. Bernstein, 350 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1973) (stating that "it is true that
defendant (as have many before him and probably many will after him) failed to read the entire
contract").
29. See, e.g., Elliot Lease Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977) (stating that
"[i]t is common knowledge, and so should have been known to [the car leasing company] that
the detailed provisions of insurance contracts are seldom read by consumers"); see also Val
Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987) (finding that average consumer
would not understand the numerous exceptions to the limitation on liability for damage to the
rental car).
30. When the context of the transaction "is such as to preclude the reasonable expectation
that the printing will be read or understood in any significant number of cases, the seller
cannot claim that he nonetheless so expected. He therefore has no basis of asserting that he
relied to his detriment on manifestations of mutual consent." W. David Slawson, Standard
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 544
(1971).
31. "A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not
ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the standard terms."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979). The principal drafter of this
section of the Restatement (Second) argued that "Customers who adhere to standardized
contractual terms ordinarily, 'understand that they are assenting to the terms not read or not
understood, subject to such limitations as the law may impose.'" Carpenter v. Suffolk
Franklin Say. Bank, 346 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Mass. 1976) (Braucher, J.) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 237 cmt. b (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7 (1973)). This statement is unhelpful for two
reasons. First, it is not at all clear that consumers "understand" that they are signing away
substantive rights or procedural rights. Second, the term "subject to such limitations as the
law may impose" is too broad, thus permitting "the law" to construe form contracts according
to either the non-drafter's reasonable expectations or an objective interpretation of the nondrafter's intent.

1270

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1263

not read form contracts both because it is unreasonable to do so and
because businesses do not want consumers to read them prior to
32
signing.
Most consumers fail to read the form contracts that pass before
them every day. 3 Consumers simply do not have the time to read
them, as exemplified by the car-renter at the airport. They also generally lack the legal background to understand the subordinate
clauses.34 Additionally, because consume know that the agent behind
the counter is not authorized to rewrite the contract, 5 they conclude
that there is little to be gained from reading a non-negotiable contract.
Moreover, businesses hardly want the consumer to read form
contracts. If the purpose of using a form is to achieve uniformity in
transaction, individualized negotiations will defeat that purpose.3 6
Additionally, businesses, like consumers, are short of time and prefer
not to have their turnover slowed by hordes of consumers pausing to
peruse pages of legalese.37
Despite wishful commentary to the contrary, 38 there is no evi32. For an economic analysis of why it is inefficient for consumers to read form contracts,
see Meyerson, supra note 3, at 596-603.
33. The rationality of not reading the form contract is strengthened by the increased
difficulty resulting from the use of excessively fine print and hopelessly convoluted language.
"[C]ontra.cts of adhesion, most of which are editorial nightmares, proliferate. There is a dark
suspicion that the same people who prepare these prepare tax forms and directions as to how
to put together packaged Christmas toys." Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 119 Cal.Rptr. 171, 173
n.l (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
34. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 8, at 45 ("Knowledge that certain words were used
creates no knowledge of the reality intended to be created."); see also Commercial Union
Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 394 A.2d 839, 841 (N.H. 1978) ("Although insurers have had over
one hundred years to hone their policies into forms that would not ferry the unwary reader on
a trip intD Wonderland, they regrettably often fully merit the criticism that Chief Justice Doe
[deploring the prolixity of complex verbiage in policies, DeLancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H.
581 (1873)] levelled at their predecessors.") (quoting Storms v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978)); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967) ("[I]t is
unlikely that [the consumer] would understand the legal jargon, and the significance of the
clauses is not explained to him.").
35. 'Employees regularly using a form often have only a limited understanding of its
terms and limited authority to vary them." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211
cmt. b (1979). See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 125 n.13 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982) (in response to the question whether there is negotiation over form terms, a
salespenson stated: "I'm not empowered to do that, sir.").
36. "One of the purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of
individu3l transactions, and that purpose would not be served if a substantial number of
customers retained counsel and reviewed the standard terms." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979). See also M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of
BargainingPower: PostBenthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. Toronto L.J. 359,
364 (1976) (stating that consumer standard form contracts are used "to reduce transaction
costs").
37. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 8, at 40-41.
38. Priest, supra note 26, at 1347.
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dence that a small cadre of type-A consumers ferrets out the most
beneficial subordinate contract terms, permitting the market to protect the vast majority of consumers. Obvious terms, such as pricing
and warranties, may be subject to such comparison shopping. It is

hard, however, to imagine a sufficient number of prospective consumers refusing to rent a car because the contract contains an unfair
forum selection clause.39
If consumers do not read and comprehend the subordinate terms
of standard form contracts, there can be no subjective agreement to
the particular terms. Furthermore, merchants and sellers who know
that consumers do not read these terms have no objective basis for

claiming that the consumers agreed to those terms. If it is both unreasonable and undesirable to have consumers read these terms, courts
should not fashion legal rules in a futile attempt to force consumers to
read these terms or to punish those who do not. 4°

The common law of contracts, it seems, has strayed for the path
of logical progression. 4 ' The wrong turn occured when the perfectly
logical assumption that a merchant's signature implied assent to negotiated terms was mistakenly applied to consumer form contracts. The
courts abandoned the objective theory in search of a seductive
consistency.
III. CLASSIC CONTRACTS
The classical legal view of standard form contracts defies logic
and invites great injustice. Essentially, under the twin banners of
39. It is similarly ridiculous to believe that advertising permits competitors to inform
consumers of unexpected harsh secondary terms. See Ware, supra note 3, at 1479. As one
commentator noted, "it would be ludicrous for a seller to base an advertising campaign on the
claim that, 'if you injure yourself on our cruise, you can sue us anywhere.'" Goldman, supra
note 3, at 719.
40. Courts attempting to force consumers to read form contracts know that they will not
succeed. This futility was recognized by the Nevada Supreme Court in Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Young, 832 P.2d 376, 379 n.2 (Nev. 1992). "Although we understand that many people may
in fact not read their insurance policies, we conclude that the consumer has at least this
responsibility. If we presume that consumers do not read policies, we would then force
insurers to explain verbally every minute detail of a policy. We must assume that the insured
party has at least read the policy and given a plain common-sense meaning to the policy's
provisions." This is not a sound basis for a decision. Courts should not presume something
they know is untrue. Besides, insurers need not explain "every minute detail," only
unexpected terms or those which contradict the rest of the policy. See infra note 289 and
accompanying text.
41. See generally POSNER, supra note 3, at 404-07.
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"freedom of contract"42 and "duty to read, ' 43 the law has given drafters of fcrm contracts the power to impose their will on unsuspecting
and vulnerable individuals.
44
The 1918 case of Morstad v. Atchinson T.& S.F. Railway Co.
demonstrates the resulting hardship and injustice. A railroad worker,
Andrew Morstad, was injured while unloading timber. He was taken
to a bunk car and was lying on a bed "in an awful pain. '45 The railroad company foreman presented him with a form and said, "[H]ere
is someihing you will have to sign before you go to the hospital. 46
Morstad, who was not wearing his reading glasses, signed the form
without reading it. The form was a settlement contract whereby Morstad "agreed" to release the railroad from all liability in exchange for
one dollar and transportation to the hospital.47
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
release, stating that "[Morstad] was guilty of such gross negligence in
not informing himself of the contents of the contract that he is
estopped to avoid the same. His lack of knowledge of the contents of
the contract was due absolutely to his own negligence. '48 The court
opined that "it is the duty of every person to read a contract before he
signs the same, if he can read, and it is as much his duty to have the
same read and explained to him before he executes it, if he cannot
'49
read or understand it."
The court gave several policy rationales for this strict rule.
Someone who signs a contract "owes it to the other party to read or
have read, the contract.., because the other party has a right to and
does conform his own conduct to the requirements of the contract . . . ."o The court also noted that permitting Morstad to go
beyond the written word would threaten to "destroy all of the efficacy
42. See, e.g., Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 221 S.E.2d 449, 504-05
(N.C. 1976) (upholding disclaimer of liability for negligent handling of yellow page advertising
because each person is "free to contract according to [his] own judgment"); contra College
Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 241 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Wis. 1976) (stating that
"[t]he unconsidered application of the principle of freedom of contract ... is not always
justified when there are extenuating circumstances which may affect the degree to which that
freedom actually exists").
43. See, e.g., Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 303 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating
that warranty disclaimer in tenth paragraph of twenty-one paragraphs on back of two-page
contract "should have attracted the attention of a reasonable buyer").
44. 170 P. 886 (N.M. 1918).
45. jrd.
at 889.
46. Zd.
47. Id. at 890.

48. Fd.
49. Id. at 889.

50. Td.
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of written contracts."5 1 The rule, the court noted in conclusion, "renders written contracts safe and secure, and just what they must be if
5' 2
the business of the world is to be carried on in an orderly fashion.
Classical courts upheld written language, even where the drafter
discouraged a semi-literate individual from reading the paper by saying, "it was all a matter of form-it was immaterial."" Judges confidently cited, "the well-settled principle that affixing a signature to a
contract creates a conclusive presumption, except as against fraud,
' Courts
that the signer read, understood, and assented to its terms."54
moralistically preached that if a person failed to read the contract,
"he cannot set up his own carelessness and indolence as a defense. ' '1"
This classical theory has no basis in either reality or justice.56
Courts had to create a "conclusive" presumption that the signing
party understood the terms because such a presumption was so
counter-factual. The drafters of the contracts knew the signing party
had not read the terms. There could be no problem of unfair surprise,
since the objective understanding of the contract drafter mirrored the
subjective reality of the non-drafter.
The other problem with the classical theory was that it permitted
drafters of form contracts to abuse their power. 57 There were no safeguards against grotesquely one-sided agreements, drafted to be signed
unread.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court gave Morstad the opportunity to prove that he received no
consideration for the release. Id. at 890.
53. Fivey v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 52 A. 472, 474 (N.J. 1902).
54. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
55. McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 100 P. 524, 526 (Okla. 1909).
56. "It is obvious that analysis of the form lease in terms of traditional contract principles
will not suffice, for those rules were developed for negotiated transactions which embody the
intention of both parties." Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. 1966).
57. See, e.g., Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (calling
form term "a snare and deceit"); Spring Valley Gardens Ass'n v. Earle, 447 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631
(N.Y. County Ct. 1982) ("[I]t is immediately apparent that [these leases] have been carefully,
painstakingly designed to provide maximum protection for the landlords and to give only the
most grudging, minimal recognition to the reasonable expectations of residential tenants.").
For a particularly angry judicial response to one such incident, see John Deere Leasing Co. v.
Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1571 (D. Kan. 1986), where the court described a form lease
term imposing a penalty for defaulting as:
written in such fine, light print as to be nearly illegible ....The court was...
required to use a magnifying glass to read the reverse side. The court found the
wording to be unreasonably complex. It is as if the scrivener intended to conceal
the thrust of the agreement in the convoluted language and fine print ....John
Deere's contention that the defendant had a duty to ascertain the meaning of all
terms, in the face of the near concealment of this unusually harsh remedy, is
inexcusably inadequate and need not be tolerated by any court. This court is
surprised that a reputable company such as Deere would stoop to this.
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In response to this problem, judges began resorting to subterfuge
to reach the result that should have been obtained directly under basic
principles of "objective appearances." Ambiguity, waiver, estoppel,
and conditions to contract were used to sidestep unpleasant results,

while t;he courts purportedly followed the path of the earlier
decisions."
Many of the finest legal scholars of the twentieth century have
tried with limited success to correct these errors, each pointing out
the inconsistency in legal reasoning and illustrating a part of the problem. More recently, serious attempts have been made to present a
formal solution to the entire area by creating a separate rule for form
contracts.5 9 The collective wisdom has brought us to the point where
contract law can now be reunified, where the objective theory of contracts is again applied to all contracts.
IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF FORM CONTRACT THEORY

The first step in the creation of a unified theory of form contracts
was the basic recognition that form contracts are fundamentally different from the classic individualized contracts that existed during the
formation of the common law. In 1919, Edwin Patterson imported
the phrase "contracts of adhesion" into American jurisprudence.'
Patterson's translation of a French writer's analysis focused on the
lack of bargaining associated with these contracts.
Doubtless, there are contracts and contracts, and we are in reality
far from the unity of contractual type assumed by the law. Eventually the law must, indeed, yield to the shading and differences that
have emerged from social relations. There are pretended contracts
that have only the name, the juridical construction of which
remains to be made. For these, in any event, the rules of individual
interpretation should undergo important modifications, if only that
one might call them, for lack of a better term, contracts of adhesion, those in which a single will is exclusively predominant, acting
as a unilateral will which dictates its law, no longer to an individ58. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 1,at 702 ("[W]e have developed a whole series of semicovert techniques for somewhat balancing these bargains."); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 972 ("The conclusion is

inescapable that courts have sometimes invented ambiguity where none existed, then resolving
the invmted ambiguity contrary to the plainly expressed terms of the contract document.");
see also Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035, 1039 (lst Cir. 1971) ("Not
infrequently the linkage between results and rational analysis has been blurred to the point of
invisibility.").
59. See infra text accompanying notes 189-90.
60. Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198,

222 (1919).
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ual, but to an indeterminate collectivity, and which in advance
undertakes unilaterally, subject to the adhesion of those who would
wish to accept the law [loi] of the contract and to take advantage of
the engagements imposed on themselves.6 1
In 1943, Friedrich Kessler presented the first full portrait of contracts of adhesion.6 2 He saw several key components: 1) "form contracts" were typically used by businesses with a "strong bargaining
power;" 2) the drafter either enjoyed a monopolistic position or used
the same contract as its competitors; 3) the weaker party understood
the legal consequences of the contract, "only in a vague way, if at all;"
and 4) the terms of the contract were presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.6 3
Kessler argued these contracts were inconsistent with traditional
notions of freedom of contract which have "delegated to individual
citizens a piece of sovereignty which enables them to participate constantly in the law making process."'
Without prescribing a particular legal treatment for form contracts, 6 Kessler complained that "our
common law of standardized contracts is highly contradictory and
66
confusing."
The same year Kessler's article was published, William Prosser
wrote an article discussing an important subtopic, disclaimers of the
implied warranty of merchantability. 67 Although neglected by most
studies of form contracts, Prosser's analysis offers a compelling understanding that is applicable to the entire field.
Prosser noted that a "disclaimer is not at all a pernicious thing in
any case where it appears that the buyer really is willing to take his
chances." 68 Thus, it is proper to enforce a contractual disclaimer
when a buyer purchases second-hand goods or when the seller lacks
61.

RAYMOND

SALEILLES, DE LA DtCLARATION DE VOLONTt

§ 89 at 229-30 (1901)

(translated in Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 856 (1964)). The first case to rely on the terminology of "adhesion" was
an insurance case, Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (N.D. 1940).
62. Kessler, supra note 11, at 632.
63. Id. The California Supreme Court has defined an adhesion contract as "a contract
entered into between two parties of unequal strength, expressed in the language of a
standardized contract, written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and
offered to the weaker party on a 'take it or leave it basis' "). Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d

168, 171 (Cal. 1966).
64. Kessler, supra note 11, at 641.
65. See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
Contracts Law by StandardForms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 32 (1984).
66. Kessler, supra note 11, at 633.
67. William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.
REV.

117 (1943).

68. Id. at 159.
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knowledge of the quality of the goods and "makes it clear" that the
sale is conditioned on the seller bearing no responsibility for their
quality. 9 In other words, risks may properly be shifted to consumers,
provided they knowingly accept them.
However, Prosser warned, when courts mechanically uphold a
seller's contract disclaiming all warranties, "a dangerous power is
placed in the hands of the seller."' 70 Prosser argued the seller cannot
reasonably suppose that a buyer "is willing to pay good money for
whatever the seller will give him, and remain completely at the seller's
mercy. ' 71 The seller knows that the typical buyer expects a particular
item to be of generally acceptable quality. Even the most comprehensive disclaimer is contradicted by the contractual description of the
goods being sold; their very name incorporates the general under'72
standing that they are "goods of the kind sold on the market.
Prosser proposed to limit the effectiveness of disclaimers of
implied warranties to those instances where purchasers could be
understood to have actually agreed to a disclaimer. Disclaimers
would be ineffective whenever "the circumstances indicate that a reasonable person in the position of the buyer would, despite such general language, be in fact relying on the merchantable quality of the
'73
goods or their fitness for a particular purpose.
One year after Prosser's article appeared, Arthur Corbin put
another small piece of the form contract puzzle into place when he
wrote his famous review of the parol evidence rule.74 Corbin argued
that the written words of a contract should not be interpreted to conflict with the contracting parties' intent. He urged judges to look
behind the writing to ascertain the parties' desires from all the circumstances surrounding the contract. Corbin declared that merger
clauses, express written contractual declarations that there are no
unwritten promises, should not be reflexively enforced. Corbin stated
that such clauses are properly understood as assertions of fact rather
than conclusions of law. He added, "paper and ink possess no magic
power to cause statements of fact to be true when they are actually
untrue."' 75 Therefore, the writing could not be conclusive because
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. i. at 160.
73. Id. at 165 (quoting the SECOND DRAFT OF THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT
§ 15(6) (1941)). Prosser's support for the phrase "general language" is probably meant to be
viewed the same as his earlier statement that "[a]ny general language of the disclaimer, no
matter how comprehensive it may be [qualifies]." Id. at 160.
74. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603 (1944).
75. LId.
at 620.
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"[a] statement in the writing that it contains all terms agreed upon
and that there are no promises, warranties, or other extrinsic provisions, is a statement of fact that may actually be untrue. ' 76 Though
the contractual language may be clear, courts should permit addi'
tional oral promises to be proven "where justice seems to require it." "
Despite the work of Prosser and Corbin, it was Karl Llewellyn
who dominated the early analysis of standard form contracts. His
writings, published from 1939 through 1960, continue to serve as the
starting point for the current debate on this topic.
Llewellyn noted that form contracts replaced "item by item"
negotiation with "standard clauses and terms, prepared often by one
of the parties only."'78 This could be a positive development, he
stated, because standardized contracts saved time and money. 79 The
danger of the forms, however, was from the potential for abuse created by the one-sided control over contract terms. To prevent that
harm, Llewellyn complained, courts used subterfuges, such as finding
ambiguity where none existed or placing strained interpretations on
clear language, to protect the non-drafting party. Llewellyn criticized
this approach as ultimately ineffective, since it permitted skillful contract writers simply to draft new language to accomplish the same
unfairness. Second, mangling legal rules limited the efficacy of the
rules in other areas of contract law without guaranteeing just results
for form contracts. Llewellyn cogently stated, "Covert tools are never
reliable tools." 80
Llewellyn's first attempt to clarify the law resulted in the following syllogism:
[F]ree contract presupposes free bargain; and ... free bargain pre-

supposes free bargaining; and that where bargaining is absent in
fact, the conditions and clauses to be read into a bargain are not
those which happen to be printed on the unread paper, but are
those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that
paper. 8 '
This statement reads like a formulation of the modem doctrine
of reasonable expectations.8 2 It is not the words on the page that con76. Id. at 621.
77. Id. at 643.
78. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 700.
79. Id. at 701. "Nothing can approach in speed and sanity of readaptation the machinery
of standard forms of a trade and for a line of trade, built to meet the particular needs of that
trade."
80. Id. at 703.
81. Id. at 704.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 210-13.

1278

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1263

trol, but the terms one would "reasonably expect" to find on the page.
Nonetheless, Llewellyn gave a great deal of deference to the
drafter. Under Llewellyn's analysis, "utterly unreasonable clauses"
would be struck down, but "a due presumption in favor of an expert's
knowledge of what the condition of his trade may be calling for"
would still be permitted. 3
Llewellyn struck a similar balance in his last major discussion of
form contracts in 1960.84 He propounded his "answer" to the question posed by form contracts:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at
all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one
thing more. That one thing is a blanket assent (not a specific
asse.nt) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may
have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which has not been
read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those
dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real
85
expression of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs in.
Llewellyn continued to believe that tradespeople knew which
clauses were most appropriate and that forms were efficient and desirable. He added that courts reviewing form terms should remember
that "there are still many which are sound particularizations of the
deal to the business, very useful and wholly within reason; and those
ought to be sustained and applied." 6
Perhaps the most vigorous attack on Llewellyn's respect for nonnegotiated terms came from Todd Rakoff, who argued that Llewellyn
had "failed to understand that it is very often the lawyer's expertise,
not the businessman's, that is revealed."187 Rakoff asserted the goal of
contract drafters was not to further the interest of the trade, but to
protect their client's interests as best possible. Thus, he proposed that
subordinate contract terms, which he called "invisible terms," be presumed unenforceable.

88

Colin Kaufman countered that it was judges who should not be
overly trusted in determining the content of form contracts.8 9 He
83. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 704.
84. KARL N. LLEWELLYN,

THE COMMON

LAW TRADITION:

(1960).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

id. at 370.
Td. at 366.
Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1205.
Id. at 1220-48.
COLIN K. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

(1992 Supp.).
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feared that Rakoff's approach would result in a change from "an
even-handed rule to a consumers only doctrine."90 Kaufman contended that form contracts, growing out of business experience and
expertise, serve a valid purpose. The role of the courts, he concluded,
is to ensure the fairness of form terms: the contract is presumed fair,
but the non-drafting party can defeat it by proving either that the
drafter has received all the benefits of the terms or that the terms are
not reasonably adapted to advance legitimate purposes. 9' In sum,
Kaufman argued, "[tihe loss of 'freedom of contract' suffered by the
customer in modern society does not require as a corollary that businesses must lose that same freedom, but only that they exercise that
'92
freedom in a fair manner."
An alternate tack was suggested by both Arthur Leff93 and David
Slawson. 94 They each saw the problems of form contracts as a public
law concern. Skeptical about the expertise of courts, each urged legislative and administrative control of the content of form contracts.95
In a subsequent article, Slawson argued such outside intervention
might not be necessary if courts continued to adopt what he termed,
"the new meaning of contract."96 Under this approach, courts are
not limited to the mere interpretation of contractual language. They
are to find the contractual obligations imposed by form contracts
based on all the circumstances. 97 The writing no longer controls.
Instead, "under the new meaning [of contracts], the reasonable expec98
tations are the contract.
One final player in the academic debate was Robert Keeton,
whose analysis of insurance contracts helped spawn the "doctrine of
reasonable expectations." 99 Even though his analysis focused on
insurance contracts, the reasoning and principles generally apply to
consumer form contracts.' °
90. Id. at 368-89.
91. Id. at 358-67.
92. Colin K. Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 38, 71 (1977).
93. Leff, supra note 6, at 147-57.

94. Slawson, supra note 30, at 557-61. See also W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts:
Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (1974).
95. Leff, supra note 6, at 147-57; Slawson, supra note 30, at 533-36.
96. Slawson, supra note 10, at 71-74.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id.
99. Keeton, supra note 58, at 966-74.
100. Since neither type of form contract is read by the typical consumer and neither results
from negotiation but is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by a drafter with greater
bargaining power, the literal language on each printed page often will not reflect the objective
understanding of the contract. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 10, at 52 (asserting that the
reasonable expectations doctrine "lacks any principled justification for being limited to
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Judge Learned Hand had espoused an earlier version of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. He wrote that the common layperson's understanding of insurance terms, not the special industry
meaning, should govern policy interpretation.'' The content of the
actual language used, however, firmly anchored this rule so that
unambiguous language still controlled: "A man must indeed read
what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek
to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance
intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting
0 2
confusion."1
In 1970, Keeton reviewed many insurance cases relying on the
insured's reasonable expectations, and he enunciated a new version of
this principle: "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."'' 0 3 The use of the
phrase "painstaking study" illustrates the lineage of the principle.
Without mandating that policyholders "read what they sign," Keeton
insurance policies"); see also Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 17 (D.C.Cir. 1984)
(applying rules of construction for insurance contracts to ordinary contract); Davis v. M.L.G.
Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 989 n.4 (Colo. 1986) (stating that because car rental "was, like most
insurance contracts, a 'form' contract prepared by the lessor and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis... 'we feel that the appropriate interpretive principles are those normally applicable to
insurance contracts.' ") (quoting Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (R.I.
1977)); Uni-Serv Corp. v. Frede, 271 N.Y.S.2d 478, 483 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 279
N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App. Term 1967) ("The rules for construction of ordinary contracts do
not differ from those to be applied to insurance contracts .... In this case, the [credit card]
contract was not negotiated and (was] exclusively prepared by plaintiff, so that rules for
construction of insurance contracts are applicable."); Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 806 n.17 (Utah 1992) (finding it "difficult to conceive why the version
of the reasonable expectations doctrine ... should be limited solely to insurance contracts").
Insurance contracts do contain some common features, such as a right of cancellation. See
William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking A PrincipledApplication, 13 PEPP. L.
REV. 267, 271-72 (1986). Also, insurance contracts are not received until after they have been
made. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 33941 (1986). Nevertheless, these features are either not determinative of the objective
understanding of consumers or are not unique to insurance contracts. See, e.g., Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (where cruise line did not send contract until ticket
paid).
101. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 849 (1947) ("An underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its
context, but the application was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go to persons
utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance, who would read it colloquially. It is
the understanding of such persons that counts ... .
102. Gaunt, 160 F.2d at 602.
103. Keeton, supra note 58, at 967. The first case to adopt explicitly a formulation similar
to Professor Keeton's was Smith v. Westland Life. Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 441 (Cal. 1975).
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implies that an unread contract containing an unexpected clause is
binding if a "casual reading" would have indicated its meaning.
In fact, one of the greatest sources of confusion over the doctrine
of reasonable expectations is whether court should indeed use it only

for contracts that are ambiguous or also for all unread language.°'4 If
the doctrine of reasonable expectations is limited to ambiguous con-

tracts, it is not a doctrine at all; it is nothing more than the traditional
105
rule that ambiguous contracts be interpreted against the drafter.
Only if courts discard the fiction that consumers read form language,
unambiguous or otherwise, will contracting parties realize their reasonable expectations.
The other major stumbling block for courts considering the doctrine of reasonable expectations is the fear that consumers will invent
expectations post hoc to receive a gain not bargained for. Rejecting

the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the Idaho Supreme Court
warned that "the periphery of what losses would be covered could be

extended by an insured's affidavit of what he 'reasonably expected' to
be covered."

10 6

104. One commentator noted three separate responses: restricting the theory to ambiguous
contracts only, utilizing the theory to determine whether a contract's "fine print" unfairly
limits a party's more prominent expectations, and looking at all the circumstances to
determine reasonable expectations. Ware, supra note 3, at 1467. Other commentators have
noted only two dominant themes. See, e.g., Rahdert, supra note 100, at 335-36, 345 (analyzing
weaker and stronger versions). There is an ongoing judicial debate concerning the subject.
Compare Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979) (enforcing
unambiguous insurance terms); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co.,
469 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1983) (same) with Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales & Serv., 828 P.2d 162 (Alaska
1991) (no ambiguity needed); Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 282-83
(Ariz. 1987) (same). A Missouri appellate court has criticized its Supreme Court for requiring
ambiguity. Compare Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo.
1991) ("The 'reasonable expectations doctrine' requires that there be a contract of adhesion
and ambiguity in the policy language") with Cobb ex rel Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 820 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Mo. App. 1991) (stating that requiring an ambiguity before
applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations is "inconsistent with the definition of the
doctrine as it applies even when 'a thorough study of the policy provisions would have negated
these expectations.' ") (quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697
(Mo. 1982)). See generally Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in
Insurance Law after Two Decades, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 823 (1990); Mayhew, supra note 100, at
278-86.
105. See National Bank v. Insurance Co., 95 U.S. 673, 679 (1877) ("It is its [the insurance
company's] language which the court is invited to interpret, and it is both reasonable and just
that its own words should be construed most strongly against [it]."); see also Ware, supra note
3, at 1469 (stating that because all courts interpret ambiguities against the drafter, limiting
reasonable expectations to ambiguous contracts effectively means there is no new doctrine).
106. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979); see also San Francisco
Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (stating
that "failing to read the contract is no excuse, otherwise all contracts of adhesion would be
unenforceable at the whim of the adhering party").
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This concern is unwarranted and confuses objective with subjective expectations. The very concept of reasonable expectations
imposes a requirement that the expectation have an objective foundation. The consumer must still show "some evidentiary basis beyond
naked belief on the part of the person seeking coverage, i.e., that it be
objectively determinable."' °7
Perhaps the real reason for the judicial reluctance to embrace the
full doctrine of reasonable expectations is the fear of creating broad
new exceptions to normal contract principles for a wide range of consumer transactions." 8 For example, when the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the doctrine of reasonable expectations, it emphasized its concern with any "attempt to craft a new and potentially sweeping equitable doctrine."' 1 9
We need no new and sweeping doctrine for interpreting consumer form contracts. Properly applied, the venerable objective theory will achieve the goals of the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
without grafting a new branch onto the jurisprudential tree. "
V.

ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE U.C.C. AND THE
SECOND RESTATEMENT

Twice has a solution to the dilemma of form contracts been close
at hand. The drafters of both the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts presented for
consideration workable proposals consistent with the objective theory
of contracts. It is no small irony that the champions of these proposals were two of the leading figures in twentieth century contract law,
107. Henderson, supra note 104, at 839.
108. Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 806 (Utah 1992). The
court describes its decision as one "to proceed interstitially with existing equitable doctrines
rather than to adopt a new doctrine with unknown ramifications." Id. at 806; see also
Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 N.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Mass. 1981) (declining without
explaination to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations and stating "[w]e are not
prepared to make this the first case in which this court adopts such an approach to the
purchase of insurance.").
109. Allen, 839 P.2d at 806. Later in the opinion, the court describes its decision as one "to
proceed interstitially with existing equitable doctrines rather than to adopt a new doctrine with
unknown ramifications .... " Id. at 806. See also Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424
N.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Mass. 1971) (declining to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations
because, without further explanation, "[w]e are not prepared to make this the first case in
which this court adopts such an approach to the purchase of insurance.").
110. Arguably, the Utah Supreme Court is, in fact, utilizing an objective theory. The court
saw no reason not to use "estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and the rule that ambiguous language is to be resolved against the
drafter... to protect against overreaching insurers ... on a case-by case basis." Allen, 839
P.2d at 805-06 (footnotes omitted). If used properly, these doctrines all can serve to identify
and protect the objective understanding of the consumer.
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Professors Karl Llewellyn and E. Allan Farnsworth, and that both
were soundly defeated in their attempt to rationalize this area of law.
In 1941, Llewellyn prepared two drafts for the proposed revision
to the Uniform Sales Act.'
The first draft, which has never been
published in its entirety before, 1 2 contained a lengthy section devoted
exclusively to form contracts.'" 3 In that section, Llewellyn explained
again his view of form contracts and proposed a regulatory scheme to
balance the competing interests. He entitled the section "DECLARATION OF POLICY, AND PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO
DISPLACEMENT OF SINGLE PROVISIONS OR GROUPS OF
PROVISIONS BY AGREEMENT."
The section generally permitted the enforcement of "particularized terms," parts of a contract to which "both the parties have...
directed their attention."" 4 It declared, however, that assent to contract terms which "are not studied and bargained about in detail by
both parties" should not be presumed unless those terms were fair." 5
This section denied enforcement of form contracts containing
unknown terms that altered the gap-filler provisions of the Code to
the drafter's benefit, the so-called "jug-handled forms. ' 116 Llewellyn
challenged the notion that fundamental contract principles required
enforcing unfair form contract terms as written: "The principle of
freedom of bargain is a principle of freedom of intended bargain.""' 7
When common-law courts first enunciated contract principles, Llewellyn noted, written contracts reflected the result of true bargaining,
and accordingly, it was fair to presume that a signature meant agreement."' Modern form contracts, however, permitted bargaining on
only a few terms such as "price, credit, date of delivery, description
and quantity.""' The rest of the contract is not negotiated and is
assumed to be the "fair and balanced" terms implied by law. 12' A
form contract that altered these terms could not be presumed, by
111. I first learned of Llewellyn's first 1941 draft in Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionabilityand
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967), which gives an
extensive history of the drafting of U.C.C.'s § 2-302, the unconscionability provision.
112. For the full text of Section I-C, see APPENDIX.
113. Karl N. Llewellyn, Unpublished First Draft of Revision to the Uniform Sales Act § IC (Sept. 1941) (This draft is contained in a letter dated September 5, 1941, from Karl
Llewellyn to Professor Underhill of Yale Law School. The letter and draft are available at the
Yale Law School library). See APPENDIX for full text of this document.
114. Id. § 1-C (l)(b).
115. Id.§ 1-C (l)(d).
116. Id. § 1-C cmt. (A)(2).
117. Id. § 1-C cmt. (A)(3).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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itself, to reflect the intent of the non-drafting party because "deliberate intent is not shown by a lop-sided form whose very content suggests that it has not been carefully read, and the circumstances of
whose execution suggest that the matters under discussion and consideration were only the matters written or typed in."' 2 1
According to Llewellyn, fair form contracts served many socially
valuable functions. 22 Usefulness alone, however, did not require that
their abuses be tolerated. "The true principle is clear enough," he
stated. "The substitution of private rule-making by one party, in his
own interest, for the balance provided by the law, is not to be recognized without strong reason shown."' 23
The heart of Llewellyn's proposed law was to permit the enforcement of unbalanced form contracts only if the non-drafter had knowingly assented to them:
If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to work a displacement or modification of the provisions of this Act in an unfair and
unbalanced fashion not required by the circumstances of the trade,
then the party claiming application of any particular provision in
such bloc must show that the other party, with due knowledge of
the contents of that particular provision, intended that provision to
provision of this Act in regard to
displace or modify the relevant
24
the particular transaction. 1

If the changes from the background law were balanced the contract would stand. To determine whether a fair balance existed,
courts had to examine several circumstances, such as whether both
parties helped prepare the contract, whether the displacement of provisions "as a whole runs disproportionately in favor of one party,"
and whether the new provisions reflect "fair expectation" in light of
trade practices.' 25
Arguing that the proposed section would better fulfill the contracting parties' expectations and reduce the confusion caused by judicial attempts to avoid harsh form-contract terms, Llewellyn wrote
that "the case for the provision stands ...

on the bewildering uncer-

tainty which exists today as to when a court will read one-party language as it is written, and when it will find a way to avoid such
121. Id. cmt. 3.
122. "[T]he expression of a body of fair and balanced usage is a great convenience, a gain in
clarity and certainty, an overcoming of the difficulty faced by the law in regulating the
multitude of different trades." Id. § I-C.
123. Id.
124. Id. § 1-C (2)(a)(i).
125. Id. § 1-C (2)(c).
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language." 1 26

Nevertheless, the drafting committee rejected the proposal.
Llewellyn's second draft of the year reported simply their conclusion
that the "machinery for administration thus far developed is inadequate, and is too unreckonable to be in keeping with the lines of the
Draft." 127 Two years later, the drafting committeed proposed a much
shorter version of the section with a far more limited scope. Courts
were to presume all but "unconscionable" form terms as terms to
which both parties had assented, regardless of whether the consumer
was aware of them. 128 Eventually this section metamorphosed into
129
the current 2-302 unconscionability provision.
The current U.C.C., therefore, lacks the straight-forward
approach Llewellyn suggested. Rather than simply acknowledging
the lack of assent restricting the enforcement of unknown one-sided
terms, the Code awkwardly focuses on the undefined and far more
limited concept of unconscionability. 3 °
Many courts have utilized the concept of unconscionability to
deal with the harshness of form contracts. 31 Unfortunately, the doctrine of unconscionability is too weak a tool to effectively analyze
these contracts. The principal difficulty arises from determining how
bad is unconscionable.
The Official Comment circuitously indicates that a court may
strike only those terms that are "so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract."' 132 The classic definition of "unconscionable" terms, "such as
126. Id. § I-C cmt. (7)(b).
127. THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 51-52 (Report and Second Draft 1941).
128. REVISED UNIFORM SALES AT § 24 (1943).

129. As finally approved, U.C.C. § 2-302 (1) provides as follows:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
130. Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953).
Perhaps, this is what Llewellyn was bemoaning when he wrote, "IT]here are so many beautiful
ideas I tried to get in ... but I was voted down." One might assume that Llewellyn was
merely relieved to have even this small victory when he termed § 2-302 "perhaps the most

valuable section in the entire Code."

LAW REVISION COMM'N OF NEW YORK, 1 N.Y.L.
REPORT AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Pub. L. No. 65,

121 (1954).
131. See, e.g., Fontaine v, Industrial Nat'l Bank, 298 A.2d 521, 523 (RI. 1973) (striking as
unconscionable clause in loan contract permitting repossession of car without demand for
payment).
132. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989). The confused nature of this section is well-illustrated by
the description in the Official Comment of the underlying purpose: "The principle is one of
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no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other, 133
fails to encompass the reality of modem form contracts. A wide
range of unfairness and inefficiency would be permitted so long as the
unread terms are not so extreme as to repulse people not under
delusion.
Unconscionability will remain an important concept, even if the
objective theory of contracts is used for form contract situations. A
court must retain the ability, in an imperfect world, to deny force to
grotesquely unfair terms. As Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, "Is
there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly embedded
...

than the basic doctrine that courts will not permit themselves to

34
be used as instrument of inequality and injustice."'
Suppose, for example, the only electric company in town includes
in the contract with its customers a confession of judgment provision.
Even assuming consumers know of the term and reluctantly accept it,
there would be something fundamentally wrong with a court permit135
ting such a clause to bar billing disputes.
Unconscionability should be saved for the extraordinarily
unfair.136 A more precise concept is needed for form contracts.
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts acknowledged the overlap between the U.C.C.'s unconscionability provision
and the developing law of form contracts and recognized the need for
a specific separate analysis of form contracts. 137 As with the U.C.C.,
the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power." Id. As has been frequently noted, § 2-302 seems
to encompass two forms of unconscionability: "oppression" implies a substantive harm while
"unfair surprise" implies procedural trickery. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 6. Arguably, a court
needs both in order to strike a particular contract term.
133. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750)).
134. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
135. This concept is illustrated by Professor Eisenberg's example of the "desperate
traveller," who is rescued from death in the desert only upon promising to pay his rescuer twothirds of his wealth or $100,000 whichever is greater. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 755-56 (1982).
136. Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit ContractLaw, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1337
(1982) ("[Unconscionability] stands today primarily as a backstop to catch any creative new
practices slippery enough to get past other protective devices, yet odious enough to fall within
its timid scope.").
137. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 515, 523 (May 22, 1970) (Statement of Mr. Charles Hastings
Willard). For an excellent discussion of the drafting of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, see John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized
Agreements under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975).
Professor (now Judge) Robert Braucher was the first Chief Reporter for the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. After his appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court of
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the path from visionary draft to final result is littered with missed
opportunities.
A 1970 draft of the section devoted to standardized agreements
stated, "[w]here the other party has reason to know that the party
manifesting such assent believes or assumes that the writing does not
138
contain a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."
This language focused on the non-drafter's knowledge and expectations. Under this version, form terms were not enforceable if the
drafter slipped into the contract terms the reasonable consumer would
not have expected. The consumer had to be aware of and consent to
unusual or novel terms. Consequently, only expected or explained
terms would have been enforceable.
During the discussion of this section by the American Law Institute's review committee, opposition arose because it was feared that
such a rule would impede freedom of contract. Charles Willard, a
New York City lawyer, argued that "many of us have signed contracts containing provisions that we wish weren't in there, but on balance we thought: All right, we want the contract, and we have to take
the good with the bad." 1 39 This reasoning ignores the reality that
form terms are unread and often unexpected. Accordingly, consumers are not actually deciding whether they desire the contract enough
to take the good with the bad terms. Nevertheless, Willard offered
replacement language that eventually became the final version of Section 211(3): "Where the other party has reason to believe that the
party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained 'a particular term, the term is not part of the
agreement."14°
Professor Farnsworth argued that such a rule would permit
enforcement of unexpected terms:
I'm troubled by the apparently simple form that contains a clause
Massachusetts in 1971, he was replaced by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth. It was Professor
Braucher who was the Chief Reporter when section 211, dealing with standardized contracts,
was drafted.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237(3) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
139. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 528 (May 22, 1970) (Statement of Mr. Charles Hastings Willard).
140. The remainder of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 reads:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like
writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he
adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included
in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

211 (1979).
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in the back of it, perhaps a more or less innocuous clause, but one
which, it turns out, because of later events is important to the person signing. It is quite possible, it seems to me, that under Mr.
Willard's language it would not be clear that he would not have
signed the agreement had he known that this clause was added;
and yet under [the] original language it would not be a part of the

contract. 141
Professor Farnsworth was unable to convince other drafters to
adopt his position. The final Restatement provision ignores the unfair
form term that deals only with a secondary consideration or unlikely
risk for the consumer. It has no effect unless the term is so egregious
that it negates the entire contract. Thus, the evils of one-sided,
unknown subordinate terms continue.
The Comments to this Section of the Restatement, however,
seem to permit a far more realistic approach. They assert that businesspeople who draft standardized agreements are aware that
"[c]ustomers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the
standard terms."' 42 The Comments further state that customers "are
not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reason143
able expectation."
This has enabled courts purporting to rely on Section 211 to
actually improve upon it. The Arizona Supreme Court, in ostensibly
adopting the rule of Section 211, held that courts should "enforce a
boilerplate term unless the drafter had reason to believe that the
adhering party would not have assented to the particular term had he
or she known of its presence."'" Note that this formulation of Section 211's rule involves the far more precise inquiry of whether a
given term in the form contract would have been assented to had it
been read and'understood. By contrast, the literal language of Section
141. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 527 (May 22, 1970) (Statement of E. Allen Farnsworth).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979).

143. Id. § 211 cmt. f. This comment further develops the idea that non-assented to terms
are non-binding,
[A] party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does not assent to a
term if the other party has reason to believe that the adhering party would not
have accepted the agreement if he had known the agreement contained the
particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be shown by the prior
negotiations or inferred from the circumstances. Reason to believe may be
inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it
eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if
the adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible
or otherwise hidden from view.
Id.
144. Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283 (Ariz. 1987) (emphasis
added).
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211 permits enforcement of such an unwanted term unless the term
was so important and unfair that the consumer would have refused to
assent to the contract. As one commentator notes, the actual words
of Section 211 of the Restatement ultimately amount to "nothing
' 45
more than an effort to deal with a species of unconscionability."'
VI.

OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

The objective theory of contracts has led to several rules for dealing with circumstances where one party is aware of the other party's
lack of knowledge. Normally, when one party, by research or fortuitously, learns information that affects the value of the bargain there is
no duty to share that information. 46 There are, however, instances
where it is both economically efficient and just to prevent a party, who
is aware of the other's misunderstanding or lack of knowledge, from
taking unfair advantage or from imposing unexpected risks and
47
burdens.'

Those who possess both superior information and the knowledge
of another's relative ignorance will not be permitted to pretend that
they are dealing with someone possessing adequate knowledge. The
doctrines of known unilateral mistake and of foreseeable consequential damages, the U.C.C.'s "Battle of the Forms" rule, and even the
tort law requirement that doctors obtain their patients' informed consent all share this underlying rationale. Close scrutiny of this theme
permits not only a fuller understanding of the objective theory of contracts, but also illustrates its proper application to form contracts.
A.

Known Misunderstandingor UnilateralMistake
Frequently, contracting parties disagree on the meaning of a
term, but one party knows or should know of the other's differing
belief. In such cases the courts will apply the meaning of the unknowing party.' 4 8 Professor Farnsworth tells the story of Temures, a legal145. Murray, supra note 137, at 1383.
146. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1817).
147. It is well established in contract law that "where the peculiar talent or the industry of
one man has given him a superiority of knowledge," it is permissible for him to withhold such
information. GULIAN C. VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTS 75
(Arno Press ed. 1972) (1825). Yet contracts that take advantage in any respect are presumed
fraudulent when it is understood by the other that no advantage will be taken. Id. at 119.
Verplanck argued that this reasoning applied to all sales and stated that if a seller's neighbor
had such confidence that the seller would sell to him at market price and that the goods the
seller offers were of merchantable quality, it would be unfair to take advantage of such
confidence. Id. at 134.
148. In the words of the early nineteenth century author Verplanck, a contract is breached
"when the thing done, or delivered, varies materially in kind, or quality, from the kind or
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istic warrior who promised a garrison that "no blood would be shed if
they surrendered." 149 Upon surrender, the garrison was buried alive,
without so much as a loophole to breathe through. A modem court
reviewing this agreement would find Temures guilty of a breach of
contract because he should have been aware of the meaning that
would likely be attached to his promise.
A similar situation arises when one party is aware of the other
party's mistake. Suppose a subcontractor submits a bid to the contractor containing an obvious mathematical error. The contractor
cannot happily accept the mistaken bid and pocket the windfall.' 50
The law excuses the mistaken subcontractor from performance
because the contractor had actual knowledge of the error. Moreover,
courts often impute such knowledge to contractors who receive a
range of bids of which one is markedly lower. The law does not
reward the unquestioning contractor who rushes to accept an offer
that is "too good to be true."'' The subcontractor prevails because
the contractor had "reason to know" of the error.
Both rules have long been accepted as wise policy. One commentator argued that the party who knows of an error is the "better mistake-preventer . . . because of his superior access to relevant
information that will disclose the mistake and thus allow its correction."'5 2 In other words, neither Temures nor the contractor should
prevail because a reasonable person in their positions should have
understood the probable intent of their negotiating partners.
Allowing those with easy knowledge of another's error to take advan5 3
tage of that knowledge would be unjust.
The same theory should apply to consumer form contracts.
Drafters know the terms of their own contracts and consumers do
not. Since the drafters are aware that consumers do not read their
contracts, the drafters know that the contract will not inform conquality... understood by the one party, and known to be so understood by the other." Id. at
148.
149. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 946 (quoting WILLIAM PALEY, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Book III, Part I, ch. V (12th ed. 1810)).
150. Tyra v. Cheney, 152 N.W. 835 (Minn. 1915). "One cannot snap up an offer or bid
knowing that it was made in mistake." Id.
151. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information and the Law of Contracts,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (1978); see, e.g., Geremia v. Boyarsky, 140 A. 749, 750 (Conn. 1928)
(granting rescission where plaintiff had "good reason to believe that a substantial error had
been made"); FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 668 (stating that a bidder can avoid a contract
if the difference from other bids was so great "as to make the mistake palpable").
152. Kronman, supra note 151, at 7-8.
153. The concept of "easy" knowledge is meant to distinguish the cases where the party
with greater knowledge acquired such knowledge as the result "of a deliberate and costly
search." Id. at 13.
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sumers of their legal rights. Similarly, if a form contract contains a
term that eviscerates the central purpose of the contract, contradicts
representations made by the seller, or deals with secondary issues not
considered by the typical consumer, the drafter should know that the
written term is unexpected. Since the term is both unexpected and
unknown to the consumer, the drafter also should know that the consumer is mistaken about the contents of the contract.
Drafters should not be permitted to take Temures-like advantage
of consumers. As one court has stated, "[w]here a party permits
another to sign a contract knowing that he is under a misapprehension as to its terms, there is equitable fraud which warrants reforma154
tion or recision."'
B. The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale
The classic case of Hadley v. Baxendale,'" recognizes the
responsibility on a party with greater knowledge. In Hadley, a mill
owner entrusted a broken engine shaft to a common carrier for delivery to a manufacturer as model for a replacement shaft. Due to the
carrier's neglect, delivery took longer than expected, and the mill
owner, who was unable to run the mill in the interim, suffered a loss
of expected profits. The court denied recovery of lost profits and
stated:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to
the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it.' 56
The court explained that breaching parties should not be responsible for special circumstances of which they are unaware, because
they can "only be supposed to have ... in [their] contemplation the
amount of injury which would arise generally.""' The court also reasoned that those who face special losses have an obvious protection of
154. Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 291 A.2d 858, 863 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1972);
see also Miller v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 62 P.2d 975, 977-78 (Okla. 1936) (finding
such exploitation to be constructive fraud); Daskolopoulos v. European Am. Bank Trust Co.,
481 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding allegations sufficient to raise issue of
fact as to whether plaintiff misunderstood the nature of lease obligations and whether
defendants were aware of that misunderstanding).
155. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
156. Id. at 151.
157. Id.
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their interests by disclosing their unexpected situation. The court
stated:
Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was
actually made was communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from
the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily
follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances
so known and communicated. 58
Thus, the rule of Hadley is that breachers are responsible only
for consequential damages they "reasonably contemplate," either
because such damages are "naturally occurring" or because they have
been disclosed. In other words, the risk of loss assumed by the promisor is that which the reasonable person in the position of the promisor would foresee.
There are several sound reasons for such a rule. First, if promisors know of special circumstances, they can negotiate special contract
terms. 59 Second, with adequate knowledge the eventual breacher
might well have decided that the likely gain from the contract was not
worth the risk of substantial damages, and thus would have foregone
the deal. Finally, greater care in negotiation might be taken, commensurate with the greater risk. The rule of Hadley "induces the
party with knowledge of the risk either to take any appropriate precautions himself or, if he believes that the other party might be the
16
more efficient loss avoider, to disclose the risk to that party." '
The same logic applies where the drafter of a form contract
inserts burdens and risks of which the consumer is unaware. Without
knowing these terms, the consumer can neither negotiate different
terms, avoid an unduly risky venture, nor utilize greater care in negotiations. It is incumbent upon the contract drafter, like the mill
owner, to disclose the greater risks and permit consumers to assume
the costs of just those losses within their "reasonable contemplation."
Without the seller's disclosure of unexpected terms, consumers should
be held to only such risks "as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the
contract...
16
158. Id.
159. The Hadley court stated that, "of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive
[the promisors]." Id.
160. Posner, supra note 3, at 61.
161. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (emphasis added).
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The U. C.C. and the Battle of the Forms

Imagine a seller with two customers: a large business making
multiple purchases and an individual consumer. Assume that both
the business buyer and the consumer order goods from the seller. The
business buyer sends a purchase order drafted by one of her attorneys
while the consumer orders by telephone. Neither buyer mentions the
implied warranty of merchantability in the order. Prior to shipment,
the seller sends identical acknowledgement forms to both purchasers,
disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability in large capital
letters. The business buyer forwards the form to her lawyer for filing;
the consumer puts the form in a kitchen drawer. Neither of them
reads the form. When the goods arrive defective, the seller raises the
acknowledgement form as a defense. Who has the better chance of
having the seller's unread limitation clause declared ineffective: the
business buyer supported by a staff of lawyers or the solitary
consumer?
1 62
While the answer for the case of the consumer is uncertain,
thanks to the "battle of the forms" section of the Uniform Commercial Code the business buyer will prevail because disclaiming the
implied warranty of merchantability is a "material alteration" of the
bargain.' 63 This section was designed to cover situations where two
parties, usually merchants, exchange forms without reading the other
party's form. For those circumstances, the Code changes the common-law "mirror image" rule and permits a contract to be formed
even if the forms contain non-identical terms."6 If courts recognize
such a contract, they need to determine which document's terms
become part of the contract. Section 2-207 (2) provides that, between
merchants, additional terms in the offeree's form become part of the
1 65
contract unless they "materially alter" the bargain.
This is a sensible rule, based on the reality that the forms are not
read and on the sense that permitting an acceptor to alter the terms of
the bargain unilaterally in an unexpected material way is unfair and
uneconomical.1 66 The Code's Official Comments state that if the
offeree's terms "are such as materially to alter the original bargain,"
162. See infra text accompanying notes 169-172.

163. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (1989). See, e.g., Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet
Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 853 (Okla. 1979) (holding such a disclaimer to be a new term
materially altering the contract and thus not part of the bargain).
164. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1).
165. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2)(b). The new terms also do not become part of the contract if they
are objected to in the offer itself, by restricting acceptance to only the terms of the offer, or by
notification shortly after receipt of the return form. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2)(a), (c).
166. FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 161.
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they do not become part of the contract "unless expressly agreed to by
the other party."' 67 The Comments also point out that "express
awareness by the other party" is the only way enforcement of such
' 68
terms would not result in "surprise or hardship."'
It would be illogical, if not plain silly, to prevent a consumer
from making the same argument. Both the business buyer and the
consumer had objectively reasonable expectations that the goods
would be at least of "average" quality. 69 Neither read the seller's
forms, which is what the seller would expect. If a disclaimer of warranty "materially alters" the bargain for the experienced business
buyer, it must surely do the same for the consumer. If anyone is to be
penalized for not reading the acknowledgement form, it should be the
merchant buyer with her cadre of lawyers, not the untrained, inexperienced consumer.
The judicial experience with Section 2-207 is useful to determine
which terms are presumably within the consumer's objective understanding of the merchant's form. In addition to refusing to enforce
disclaimers of warranties, courts applying Section 2-207 have also
refused to enforce clauses that limit the remedy for breach of warranty to replacement, 70 require the buyer to pay the seller's attorneys' fees, 17 ' mandate the seller's choice of law, 172 or compel
arbitration. 7
If courts do not enforce such terms, absent knowing assent,
against a merchant engaging in the battle of the forms, they certainly
should not enforce them against the unarmed consumer. Consumers,
no less than merchants, are entitled to enter contracts free from surprise and hardship.
167. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3.
168. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4.
169. This was Professor Prosser's argument in favor of enforcing disclaimers of the
warranty of merchantability only with actual assent. See supra text accompanying notes 6773.
170. Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Kentucky Elec. Steel Co., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1430
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
171. Johnson Tire Serv., Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521 (Utah 1980).
172. General Instrument Corp. v. Tie Mfg. Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see
also Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Molon Motors & Coil, Inc., 477 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984). But see Coastal Indust., Inc. v. Automatica Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375, 379 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding choice of New York law did not materially alter the contract because
"[tlhe application of New York law comports with the objective intent of the parties ...in that
New York law bears a reasonable relation to the sales transaction in issue").
173. Coastal Indus., 654 F.2d at 379; see also Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380
N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 1978). But see Diskin v. J.P. Stevens, 652 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1987)
(holding that arbitration clause does not materially alter the contract when trade usage
indicates that arbitration is common).
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D. Informed Consent
To facilitate understanding of the relationship between knowledge and assent one can draw a useful comparison with the tort law
requirement that physicians obtain a patient's informed consent
before commencing treatment. This requirement predates the American Revolution, 74 and is based on the principle that "[e]very human
being... has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
5
body."'

17

Courts have consistently recognized that "[t]rue consent to what
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each."'' 76 The patient's "right of
self decision ... can be effectively exercised only if the patient pos77
sesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice.'
Medical knowledge is not presumed to be in the possession of the
non-expert patient. "The doctrine of informed consent takes full
account of the probability that unlike the physician, the patient is
untrained in the medical science, and therefore depends completely on
the trust and skill of his physician for the information on which he
makes his decision."'' 78 Patients are not responsible for ferretting out
the necessary relevant information, because few patients have the
knowledge and ability to "identify the relevant questions in the
absence of prior explanation by the physician. Physicians and hospitals have patients of widely divergent socio-economic backgrounds,
and a rule which presumes a degree of sophistication which many
79
members of society lack is likely to breed gross inequities.'
To ensure that consent to medical procedures is true informed
174. "[I]t was improper to disunite the callous without consent; this is the usage and law of
surgeons .... " Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767) (quoted in
LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983)).
175. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.). Some
courts have premised the doctor's duty to disclose information on a fiduciary-type relationship
with a patient. See, e.g., Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (N.M. 1962). One can argue
that a lawyer drafting a form contract who is aware that the consumer will not rely on legal
counsel in determining whether to sign the contract also has a fiduciary-type obligation not to
overreach against the uncounseled consumer.
176. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Sard v. Hardy, 379
A.2d 1014, 1019 (Md. 1977) (stating that effective consent "must have been an 'informed'
consent, one that is given after the patient has received a fair and reasonable explanation of the
contemplated treatment or procedure.").
177. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786; see also Pegram v. Sisco, 406 F. Supp. 776, 779 (W.D.
Ark. 1976).
178. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1020.
179. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783 n.36.
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consent, doctors must disclose material risks.1 0 This requirement
squares with the objective theory of contracts. A reasonable physician should not assume that a patient consents to medical procedures
unless the doctor has provided the information necessary to permit an
8
informed choice.1 '
The objective theory protects the physician as well. If the information is presented in an appropriate manner, it is irrelevant whether
an individual patient subjectively understands the situation, since "the
physician discharges the duty when he makes a reasonable effort to
convey sufficient information, although the patient, without fault of
the physician, may not fully grasp it.' s2 Similarly, the information
the doctor must convey is based on what the doctor would reasonably
assume the patient did not know: "There is no obligation to communicate those [dangers] of which persons of average sophistication are
aware. Even more clearly, the physician bears no responsibility for
discussion of hazards the patient has already discovered ..
18.s3
Courts reviewing consumer form contracts should apply similar
principles. A consumer's true assent should be understood as the
informed exercise of a choice, which is effectively exercised only if the
consumer possesses enough information to make an intelligent choice.
As with medical knowledge, knowledge of legal rules cannot be
presumed for the layperson. As patients are generally uneducated
about medical procedures, few consumers possess the legal acumen
even to identify the relevant questions. Consumers should only be
held to have consented to unread terms of which they have been
informed.
Drafters of form contracts must not be permitted to presume
assent to unexpected terms unless they adequately disclosed such
terms. In the world of contracts, as in the realm of medicine, true
assent by the non-expert requires informed consent.
VII.

EARLY JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS AT A UNIFIED THEORY

In the 1950s, courts began to consider directly the issue of form
contracts as a category unto themselves. While courts did not change
the classic framework, some judges began arguing for a "realistic"
resolution of these cases.
180. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022. "A material risk is one which a physician knows or ought to
know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position .... "
181. See Rogers v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 119 So. 2d 649, 652 (La. Ct. App.
1960) (characterizing general consent to all procedures "as found necessary" to be "almost
completely worthless").
182. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15.
183. Id.
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8 4 the Second Circuit
In Siegelman v. Cunard White Star,"
enforced language from a cruise line's contract limiting the time for
passengers to file suit to one year. In dissent, Judge Frank urged the
court to consider the cruise contract a "contract of adhesion" and
argued that courts should refuse "to enforce directly.., highly unfair
provisions of all so-called 'contracts of adhesion' where there was no
possibility of real bargaining."'8 5 Contending that the consumer did
not really assent to the unknown terms in the form contracts, Judge
Frank stated "[in such a standardized or mass-production agreement, with one-sided control of its terms, when the one party has no
real bargaining power, the usual contract rules, based on the idea of
'freedom of contract,' cannot be applied rationally. For such a contract is 'sold not bought.' " '86
A few years later, an Illinois appellate court criticized its own
state's Supreme Court for upholding lease provisions exempting landlords from liability to tenants. 8 " The lower court argued that when
standard forms are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, "there
remains little of the element of liberty to contract as one chooses,
'88
which is the essence of the public policy of freedom of contract."'
The court argued that "this fragment of a liberty" must not trump the
state's policy that people should be liable for harm they inflict
through the negligent performance of their duties.
Soon thereafter, courts began to create rules explicitly governing
form contracts. The two most influential cases were Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors" 9 and Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture

Co. 190

In Henningsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to
enforce a form term severely limiting the warranty protection for a
new automobile.' 9' Critics of this case point to the court's reliance on
the fact that there were only a few car manufacturers and that they all
184. 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
185. Id. at 205 (Frank, J., dissenting). He noted, "The one party dictates its provisions; the
other has no more choice in fixing those terms than he has about the weather." Id. at 204.
186. Id. at 204.
187. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld such a clause in O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith
Realty Co., 155 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 1958).
188. Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldg., 155 N.E.2d 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958).
189. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
190. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
191. The warranty clause, in fine print on the back of contract, limited warranty protection
to the first ninety days or 4000 miles, whichever came first, and required that the consumer
prepay shipping charges for transporting the defective automobile to the manufacturer.
Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 74. The clause concluded that "this warranty being expressly in lieu
of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its part."
Id.
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used the same disclaimer. 92 The real lesson of Henningsen has been
its recognition that the paradigm of free bargaining is absent from
consumer form contracts. The dealer presented the contract to the
Henningsens "without authority to alter it; his function is ministerial-simply to deliver it.' 1

93

The fine print on the back of the con-

tract "was such as to promote lack of attention rather than sharp
scrutiny" and even if a consumer saw the language, the ordinary
layperson would not "realize what he was relinquishing in return for
what he was being granted."' 94 Accordingly, the general principle
that those who do not read contracts cannot escape from unknown
terms has "prove[n] to be inadequate under the impact of later experience."' 95 The unilaterally imposed contract terms "resemble a law
rather than a meeting of the minds."' 9 6 Thus, based on "public policy," the Henningsens recovered for the damage caused by the defective automobile, despite the contract's disclaimer. 97
The Williams court used the doctrine of unconscionability to justify its refusal to enforce a densely written "add-on" clause, which
allowed the seller to repossess every item previously sold to a consumer in the event of a single default. '98 This case has also been subject to criticism, especially for its discussion of the particular
consumer's lack of education and status as a welfare recipient.1 99
Nonetheless, Williams is important for any understanding of form
contracts, because it stands on the fact that the consumer not only
was unaware of the add-on clause, but that the seller knew of this
unawareness. The court concluded that when a consumer signs such
a "commercially unreasonable" contract, "with little or no knowledge
of its terms," it cannot be said "that his consent, or even an objective
192. The court limited its holding due to the "unique" status of the 1960 American
automobile industry, where oligopolistic conspiracies prevented effective bargaining:
The status of the automobile industry is unique. Manufacturers are few in
number and strong in bargaining position. In the matter of warranties on the
sale of their products [they] present a united front. From the standpoint of the
purchaser, there can be no arms length negotiating on the subject.
Id. at 94. But courts rely on the case when form contracts are used, even in the absence of
oligopolistic conditions. See, e.g., Higel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989-90 (Colo.
1976) (discussing Henningsen as applying to disclaimers of warranties in a "consumer sale.").
193. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 87.
194. Id. at 92.
195. Id. at 84.
196. Id. at 86.
197. Id. at 94-95.
198. The clause stated that "all payments now and hereafter made by (purchaser] shall be
credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by [purchaser]
at the time each such purchase is made." Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The court accurately termed this a "rather obscure provision." Id.
199. Id. at 448-49.
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manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. ' ' 2°° Thus,
the reasonable merchant cannot assume assent to an unknown, unreasonable term and cannot demand its enforcement.
Since these early attempts to solve the form contact delimma,
courts throughout the country have begun to interpret form contracts
based on the reasonable understanding of the consumer rather than
on the actual terms known only to the drafter. While courts use a
wide range of formulations to reach their conclusions, their common
ground is a realistic application of the objective theory of contracts.
VIII.

THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONSUMER FORM
CONTRACTS

The typical consumer neither reads nor comprehends the terms
of a form contract.' ° 1 More significantly, because drafters know that
consumers are unaware of the terms of the contract they cannot reasonably believe that consumers have agreed to the unknown terms.
What, then, should a reasonable drafter believe consumers are thinking when they sign the contract?
As a general rule, consumers should only be bound by those contract terms that they know and comprehend.20 2 The central or dickered terms of a contract properly bind the consumer because the
consumer is obviously aware of them.20 3
Similarly, when a consumer reads and comprehends subordinate
terms or when the seller points out and explains a complex term, the
seller should be able to treat the consumer's assent as an assent to the
discussed term .2° Absent policy reasons to the contrary, such as a
200. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
202. All contract provisions, however, are subject to unconscionability analysis. See supra
text accompanying notes 129-32.
203. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 84, at 370.

204. See Meyers v. Guarantee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 144 Cal. Rptr. 616, 620 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (stating that because borrower "admitted to having read and understood the contract,
his subjective expectations were not objectively reasonable"). Professor Keeton has argued to
the contrary. "If the enforcement of a policy provision would defeat the reasonable
expectations of the great majority of policyholders to whose claim it is relevant, it will not be
enforced even against those who know of its restrictive terms." ROBERT E. KEETON,
INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT § 6.3(b), at 358 (1971). He reasoned that a policyholder who
takes the time to read and understand the policy should not be penalized for doing so. Id.
Keeton's argument flies in the face of the objective theory of contracts. A consumer who
knows of and understands a term and then assents to a contract can reasonably be held to have
agreed to that term by not objecting to it. This rule does not put a premium on ignorance. See
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 155 (Ind. 1971) (Prentice, J., dissenting). First,
since very few consumers read their contracts, the number of consumers affected is minuscule.
Second, the contract drafter, by pointing out unusual terms, can avoid the consumer's
ignorance as well as the drafter's advantage therefrom.
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merchant's promise not to enforce a term, unconscionably onerous
terms, 2°5 or inherently coercive situations, 20 6 knowledgeable consumers should be held to their agreements.
The degree of disclosure required of the seller is that which
enables a reasonable consumer to understand both the meaning and
effect of a term. One court stated that obtaining the consumer's
knowing assent "could easily have been done in this case by explaining to plaintiff in laymen's terms the meaning and possible consequences of the disputed clause. ' 20 7 Even if an individual consumer
does not understand the clause, the drafter can reasonably rely on an
objectively adequate disclosure.
In cases where a consumer does not know or understand the

terms of a form contract, courts must examine the circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine the consumer's objective
understanding. Because the consumer is clearly acquiring something,

courts can look to the "purpose" for the acquisition: Why would one
likely make such a purchase? Consumers share a basic understanding
of what is to be expected from a particular product or service. For
example, if a consumer calls and orders a pizza to be delivered and
the store sends over a piece of cooked dough covered with pineapple
rather than tomato or cheese, the consumer may rightfully reject the
delivery.
Next, courts should determine whether the business seller or ser-

vice provider had reason to assume that the item or service being
205. See supra text accompanying note 132.
206. Examples of coercive situations include a doctor's waiting room just prior to surgery,
see infra text accompanying note 319, or a monopolistic environment, see, e.g., Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 94 (N.J. 1960). It has been argued that notice will not assist
consumers who are not free to bargain. See Mueller, supra note 4, at 581. Outside of coercive
situations, a consumer with understanding and knowledge can indeed leave a take-it-or-leave-it
proposition. For example, if a consumer tells a film processor that she greatly values a roll of
film and is told that the store does not guarantee its work, if the film is later lost or ruined, the
developer should not be responsible for damages beyond replacement of the film. A consumer
who proceeds to make a contract on such terms should be held to assume the risk of loss. Cf
Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1979) (no clear notice given). For a
discussion of Mieske, see infra text accompanying notes 268-71. However, merchants must
not be permitted to entice a consumer into a deal and then spring an unfair term on the
consumer at the last minute when backing out of the contract would be impractical, expensive,
or difficult. The test should be whether a reasonable person in the drafter's position would
understand that voluntary assent had been given.
207. Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1976); see also Wheeler
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("The hospital's admission
clerk need only direct the patient's attention to the arbitration provision, request him to read
it, and give him a simple explanation of its purpose and effect, including the available
options."). This standard is similar to that for informed consent to medical procedures, which
requires "a reasonable effort to convey sufficient information ....
Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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acquired was not expected to perform to industry standards. °8
Absent solid evidence to the contrary, courts should find that the reasonable consumer does not intend to waste money by paying "market
price" for unmarketable goods or services. If you hire someone to
mow your lawn, you expect the work done to be of "reasonable
quality."
Courts also need to expect that the consumer is likely to have
spoken with a salesperson or agent and may well have seen advertisements for the product or service. Statements made by both seller and
consumer contribute to the average customer's understanding of contractual rights and remedies.
Other important considerations, however, are usually totally
absent from a consumer's contemplation at the time of contracting.
For example, consumers rarely consider even the possibility of a subsequent legal action. Courts and sellers should realize that consumers
do not knowingly assent to terms that effectively discard their legal
rights.
Such considerations do not interfere with true freedom of contract. Merchants remain free to create the bargain they desire as long
as the consumer knowingly assents. The affirmative duty placed on
the seller to inform consumers of unexpected terms creates a contracting situation far closer to the paradigm of the classic "bargaining
table" than any anachronistic duty-to-read rule. As one court
observed:
Such a requirement does not detract from the freedom to contract,
unless that phrase denotes the freedom to impose the onerous
terms of one's carefully-drawn printed document on an unsuspecting contractual partner. Rather, freedom to contract is enhanced
by a requirement
that both parties be aware of the burdens they are
°9
assuming.'

Only through a realistic application of the objective theory to
form contracts can both sellers and consumers exercise the free will
essential to the freedom of contract. A growing number of courts
recognize this principle. Some courts utilize the "doctrine of reason21
able expectations,"2 1 while others discuss "contracts of adhesion" '
or "unconscionability. 2 2 Another group unfortunately resorts to

208. See Prosser, supra note 67, at 160.
209. Johnson, 415 F. Supp. at 269.
210. See Ware, supra note 3, at 1467. See also Puritan Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900,
904 (Alaska 1979).
211. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981).
212. See, e.g., Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16, 18 (N.J. 1974).
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judicial subterfuge, 213 which so offended Llewellyn, to reach the same
result. Nevertheless, a review of how these courts enforce the objective understanding of the parties, rather than mechanically applying
the literal written language, brings the modern practice into sharper
focus.
A.

The Purpose of the Contract

Every contract has a purpose. Under contract law, the undisclosed subjective purpose of the parties is irrelevant. Instead, courts
are concerned with "objective" purpose. Where there is a "common"
or "obvious" reason for the transaction, courts rarely permit
unknown contract terms to defeat that purpose.
Consider the case of a consumer renting an automobile who paid
extra for a "physical damage waiver" (PDW) or a "collision damage
waiver" (CDW), whereby the rental car company agreed to waive all
claims against the renter for damage to the car. 214 The car was subsequently damaged in an accident, and the renter was issued a traffic
citation. The rental company argued that the renter was liable
because he had violated a contract clause prohibiting the use of the
car "in violation of any laws or ordinances applicable to the operation
...of the vehicle. ' 215 Because the unread clause would defeat the
obvious purpose behind the purchase of the PDW, the court rejected
this contention, stating:
Clearly, consumers ... elect PDW coverage with the reasonable
expectation that if they are involved in an automobile accident,
they are protected from damage liability, regardless of fault. To
permit the insertion of technical language in a standard form contract that would nullify PDW coverage whenever the operator's
simple negligence results in a traffic violation defeats the purpose of
purchasing such coverage.21 6
Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court refused to enforce unambiguous contractual language eliminating collision damage waiver
protection for inter alia falling asleep at the wheel.217 The court rea213. See Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 291 A.2d 858, 863 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1972)
(equitable fraud); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1977) (forfeiture); Elliot
Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977) (finding ambiguity in a contract
containing "an admittedly unequivocal provision"); Smith v. The Peoples Bank of Elk Valley,
No. O1AO-9111-CV-00421, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3,
1992) (public interest); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex. 1975) (public
policy).
214. Syme v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 520 A.2d 1110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
215. Id.at 1114.
216. Id.
217. Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987). One of 16 exceptions
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soned that while "[tihe contract appears to absolve the renter of liability for damage to the car if the renter purchases the CDW ...[t]he
exceptions swallow the protection."21 The court stated, "It is only
after reading and digesting those sections that the reader would realize the full import of the limitations on the rental company's
waiver. ' 2 9 Because the unread exception contradicted the very concept of the CDW, the court refused to enforce the exception and
thereby defeat the purpose of the contract.22 °
Protecting the purpose of the contract frequently requires striking unknown disclaimers of implied warranties.221 When someone
purchases a new machine designed to make concrete blocks, for
example, absent contrary discussion, the objective understanding is
that the machine will successfully make concrete blocks.2 22 In Myers
v. Land,22 a the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to uphold contractual language that denied the existence of implied warranties in the
sale of such a machine. The court noted:
Though the present disclaimer of warranty is clear in its terms, we
cannot overlook the fact that it is to be found in a long and formito the CWP listed on the back page, the provision provided that the -[v]ehicle shall not be
used or operated by any person... who is not sufficiently alert or capable or properly or safely

driving vehicle." Id.
218. Id. at 650, 652.
219. Id. at 650.
220. Id. at 652. The Supreme Court of Nevada likewise refused to deprive a driver of
liability protection after the driver made an improper left turn which resulted in an accident,
arguing that such an interpretation would "read a very material limitation into the waiver
agreement." Automobile Leasing & Rental, Inc. v. Thomas, 679 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1984). The
court reasoned that "[t]he ordinary reader would not assume that an unqualified promise of
this nature only covered accidents not caused by the negligence of the operator of the
automobile. Indeed just the opposite is true. [A collision waiver] is generally understood to
cover whatever accidents occur, regardless of the negligence of the operator." Id. at 1271
(quoting Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (R.I. 1977) (limiting scope of
collision insurance restriction)). Accord Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986);
Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales and Serv., 828 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991).
221. See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 125 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982) ("Since a product's performance forms the fundamental basis for a sales contract, it is
patently unreasonable to assume that a buyer would purchase a standardized mass-produced
product from an industry seller without any enforceable performance standards."); Steele v.
J.I. Case Co., 419 P.2d 902, 903 (Kan. 1966) (striking limit on warranty liability for sale of
farm equipment where seller knew "the urgency of harvest" and the limitation was never
"called to the buyer's attention"); Berg v. Stromme, 484 P.2d 380, 385 (Wash. 1971) ("The
purported disclaimers of warranty ...highlight the absurdity of a rule of law which elevates
these bland and substantially meaningless terms and conditions above the individually and
expressly negotiated terms and conditions ....). Of course, a buyer is always free to purchase
knowingly an item without a warranty. See Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, 617
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966) ("When two parties bargain on an equal basis and the buyer is willing to
buy a pig in a poke there is no policy of the law to prevent such a transaction.").
222. Myers v. Land, 235 S.W.2d 988 (Ky. 1950).
223. Id.
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dable document prepared by the seller and that it was doubtless
unnoticed or its import uncomprehended by the buyer. Anyone
brought up to believe that for every wrong there is a remedy will
pause before saying that the seller will escape all liability by merely
putting in an order blank a statement to the effect that there is no
assurance that the buyer will get a machine that will work. We have
paused for the moment and have readily concluded that the avoidance of
liability under such a circumstance is not permitted by the
4
law.

22

Numerous insurance cases hold that because the insured is
attempting to purchase protection against a particular contingency
undisclosed terms should not be permitted to defeat this expectation.2 25 In PuritanLife Insurance Co. v. Guess,226 a consumer entered

into a contract for life insurance after paying a $100 premium and

getting a receipt. 22' The consumer was unaware that this was a so-

called "conditional receipt," which provided coverage only after a
medical examination. The Alaska Supreme Court held that insureds
who pay a premium reasonably expect coverage for their money. The

court therefore refused to enforce the "conditional receipt" language
because it would have defeated the logical purpose of the payment.
The court placed the burden of showing adequate disclosure on the

insurer, stating:
[W]e require that the insurer's agent, who negotiates the application, personally draw to the attention of the applicant any limiting
condition. The insurer has the burden of showing that it had taken
appropriate steps to inform the applicant for insurance of such
conditions, and that the applicant, therefore, could not have had a
reasonable expectation that he was immediately protected.2 28
224. Id. (emphasis added). See also Martin v. Harris Joseph Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir.
1985) (refusing to enforce disclaimer of warranty on seeds sold to farmer); Chandler v. Aero
Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 1967) (refusing to enforce written limit on
moving company's liability "unless the shipper had been given reasonable notice by the carrier

that he actually had a choice of 'higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater
or lesser charge.' ") (citations omitted); Mallory v. Conida Warehouses, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 825,
828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 554 P.2d 349
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (striking warranty disclaimer for used car); Klein, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 61517 (same).
225. See. e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 824 P.2d 302, 306
(N.M. 1992) (holding that "a policy provision excluding liability should be disregarded or
stricken because it is repugnant to-i.e., contradicts-a provision extending coverage to
certain losses").
226. 598 P.2d 900, 902 (Alaska 1979).
227. Id. at 902.
228. Id. at 906; see also Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Pa.
1978) (stating that "ifnothing is said about the complicated and legalistic phrasing of the
receipt, and the agent accepts an application for insurance together with the first premium
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Similarly, those purchasing theft burglary insurance reasonably
expect coverage against "a bona fide third party burglary, ' 229 and
those purchasing life insurance reasonably expect coverage against
unintentional death, 230 and a couple purchasing automobile insurance
together reasonably expects to be insured regardless of which spouse
is driving. 23' In the automobile insurance case, the court added:
The possibility remains that these limitations were called to [the
husband's] or [the wife's] attention, that [the husband] and not [the
wife] was the named insured for a specific reason, such as the
request of either, or that for some other reason the transaction was
accomplished in accordance with the understandings or wishes of
the parties. If [the insurance company] can prove this, we will
enforce the limitation of coverage against [the wife]. 23 2
Of course, looking to the purpose of a transaction can also work
in favor of the seller.23 3 In Estrin Construction Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. ,234 a contractor purchased general liability insurance for
a construction project. When a wall collapsed, the contractor
attempted to recover under the policy for its own losses. 235 The insurance company refused to pay, citing a clause that excluded payments
for property damaged while in the "care, custody or control" of the
contractor.2 3 6 The court ruled for the insurance company, stating
that "[tihe dominant purpose of such a standard liability insurance
policy ... is to insure against liability to others, not to oneself. The
exception, therefore, subserves the dominant purpose of the transaction, rather than avoids that purpose. "237
payment, the applicant has reason to believe that he is insured. Otherwise, he is deceived.")
(quoting Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 483 P.2d 682, 685 (Idaho 1971)).
229. C & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975). See
also Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 668 (N.D. 1977) ("It is not
unreasonable for a buyer to have a reasonable expectation that when he buys and pays for
'farm liability' insurance, it will cover liability arising out of any of his normal farming
operation, unless excluded operations are called to his attention.").
230. See, e.g., Jones v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). See
generally Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y. 1930) ("A policy
of insurance is not accepted with the thought that its coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo
or a Hercules.").
231. Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 281 (Ariz. 1987).
232. Id. at 285.
233. See, e.g., Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 621 (Iowa
1984) (holding that a due-on-sale clause in a home mortgage did not contradict the dominant
purposes of the transaction--either purchasing a house or permitting the buyers to sell the
property later at a profit).
234. 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
235. Id. at 415.
236. Id.
237. Id. See also Continental Ins. Co. v. Bussel, 498 P.2d 706 (Alaska 1972). In Bussel, a
liability insurance policy was held not to include death benefits owed by an employer to
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The goal of the objective theory of form contracts is not to
reward the consumer,238 but to effectuate the reasonable understanding of the contracting parties. Unread and undisclosed form terms
should not defeat the purpose of a contract. Courts, accordingly,
should read restrictive terms in the context of the overall purpose of
the contract. Where the restrictive term effectively defeats the essential purpose of the contract, the restrive term must give way.
B.

The Purpose of the Clause

Just as every contract has a purpose, so does every clause.
Although clauses may have multiple or even different purposes for
each party, there should always be an answer to the question "Why is
this clause in the contract?" The focus of this inquiry will often be to
determine what contingency the clause was intended to cover or what
risk was sought to be avoided.
Even a clause with a valid purpose may be illegitimate if its reach
exceeds its purpose. If two parties with equal knowledge hammer out
a deal, negotiations will tend to lead to clauses that serve intended
purposes without unreasonably harming either party.239 In a nonnegotiated form contract, there is no such check on overbroad provisions far exceeding legitimate purposes. Sellers should realize that
consumers signing form contracts implicitly assume that the contract
terms serve legitimate purposes without causing unnecessary harm.
Courts should therefore enforce obscure or hidden form terms only to
the extent that the terms serve legitimate interests. 24
For example, courts permit a form contract clause to reduce the
statutory time for filing causes of action because legitimate interests
are at stake. The shortening of a statute of limitations can help insurance companies protect against fraudulent claims that cannot be
refuted due to lost witnesses, misplaced evidence, and faded memo" ' Such a clause, though, should only block a valid
ries.24
claim when it
employees: "The policy itself is entitled, 'Liability Insurance Policy' as contrasted with the

title of a life insurance policy." Id. at 710.
238. Proponents of the classical duty-to-read school often try to discredit those arguing for
the objective theory by charging that their true goal is mindless one-sided boosterism for
consumers and against business. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 3, at 1466 ("Advocates saw in the
reasonable expectations doctrine a unifying principle that would resolve more cases in favor of
the insured and would do so in an open and principled manner.").
239. Confidence that negotiations will produce rational contract terms is highest in the
idealized, perfectly competitive market. See Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 746-48.
240. As long ago as 1884, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that "where the reason
of a [contract] condition does not apply this court has refused to apply it." Grandin v.
Rochester German Ins. Co., 107 Pa. 26, 37 (1884).
241. Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 441, 445 (Ariz. 1982).
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serves its valid purposes. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that a
clause limiting the time for the filing of a cause of action is enforceable
only if "the insurer has shown prejudice by reason of the delay in
filing suit."2'42 The court reasoned that:
The provision is not one which is bargained for and its application
in the face of an otherwise valid claim defeats the reasonable coverage expectations of the insured; in the absence of prejudice to the
insurer, caused by the late filing of suit, enforcement leads to an
effectual forfeiture of the claim, thus creating an inequitable result.
. .. Where the conditions do no more than provide a trap for
the unwary, the insurer will be estopped to raise them. We thereby
grant the consumer his reasonable expectation that coverage will
not be defeated by the existence of provisions which were not negotiated and in the ordinary case are unknown to the insured ....
The clause will be enforced when the reasonsfor its existence are
thereby served and will not be applied when to do so would be to
defeat the basic intent of the parties in entering into the insurance
transaction.243

The California Supreme Court reasoned similarly when it
examined a bank's six dollar charge for processing checks drawn on
commercial accounts without sufficient funds to cover the checks
(NSF checks). 2 " The depositor argued the fee was unconscionable
because it was twenty times greater than the actual thirty cent cost to
the bank for processing NSF checks.245 The court held that in order
to determine the enforceability of the fee "inquiry into its basis or
justification is necessary. "246
242. Id. at 443, 448; accord Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1977);
see also Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 821 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Ky. 1991) (holding that an
insurer cannot withdraw coverage on the ground that a provision requiring prompt notification
of an accident was not met, unless the insurer can show that it was prejudiced).
243. Zuckerman, 650 P.2d at 447-48 (emphasis added); accord Burne v. Franklin Life Ins.
Co., 301 A.2d 799, 803 (Pa. 1973) (holding that condition in life insurance policy limiting
recovery to deaths occurring within 90 days from date of an accident was inapplicable where

there was no dispute over cause of death); see also Jones v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
670 P.2d 1305, 1312 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (construing insurance policy provision requiring
an accident to be the "sole cause" of an injury as meaning the "dominant cause" of the injury);
Smith v. Municipal Mut. Ins. Co., 289 S.E.2d 669, 671-72 (W. Va. 1982) (construing insurance

contract provision stating that mailing is adequate notice, as requiring actual notice).
244. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985).
245. Id. at 512.
246. Id. at 513. The court noted that "the bank charges the same fee whether it honors or
rejects an NSF check. The fee, consequently, cannot be intended as compensation for the
credit risk arising from paying such a check, or for the interest on the amount loaned." The
court remanded the case so that the parties could present evidence on "the commercial setting,
purpose, and effect" of the NSF charge. Id. at 514. See generally Capital Associates, Inc. v.
Hudgens, 455 So. 2d 651, 653-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (striking as unconscionable an
acceleration clause permitting jukebox lessor to recover $12,000 in unaccrued rent for
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In C & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. ,247 the
insured assumed he was covered when his warehouse was robbed.
There were tire treads showing where the burglars used a truck to
haul away goods. The insurance policy, though, provided coverage
only if there were "visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity
or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises. ' '24 ' The insurance company denied recovery because the only
damage was to an interior door.24 9 The Iowa Supreme Court held
that the purpose of the policy limitation was a "requirement of visual
evidence (abundant here) indicating the burglary was an 'outside' not
an 'inside' job. ' 250 Because the evidence indicated an "outside" job,
there was no legitimate reason strictly to enforce the provision against
the insured.
This analysis does not mean that the consumer always wins. If a
form clause is appropriately tailored to fulfill its purpose, it should,
and will, be enforced. For example, the Educational Testing Service
(ETS) reserves, in its contract with those taking the Law School
Admission Test, the unilateral right to cancel a test-taker's score upon
suspicion of cheating. 25' This was upheld because ETS's ability to
cancel a score it reasonably believed did not reflect a candidate's aptitude for law school increased the test's predictive ability and thus
served the legitimate interests of ETS, law schools, and the public in
general.252 This was not viewed as an unfair, unbalanced clause.
Because ETS offered the applicant the right to take a free retest with a
commitment that, if the retest score was close, the original score
would be reinstated, the form term was "eminently fair and reason'253
able under the circumstances.
Restricting the reach of overbroad terms in form contracts more
accurately reflects the objective understanding of the consumer.
Moreover, such restriction serves as an effective proxy for the face-toface negotiation envisioned by traditional contract law.
equipment resold for $1,000); Spring Valley Gardens Assoc. v. Earle, 447 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631
(Rockland County Ct. 1982) (striking $50 late fee for ten-day delay in paying $405 monthly
residential rent).
247. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
248. Id. at 171 (emphasis added).

249. Id.
250. Id.at 177.
251. K.D. v. Educational Testing Serv., 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 (S.Ct. N.Y. County 1976). The
provision was in a booklet presented to all LSAT takers and read, "We reserve the right to

cancel any test score if, in our sole opinion, there is adequate reason to question the validity.
Before exercising this right, we will offer you an opportunity to take the test again at no

additional fee." Id. at 749.
252. Id.at 752.
253. Id.
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The Information Exchanged

Even in a form contract situation there is often communication
between the parties. Statements are made by the seller, the seller's
agent, or the consumer. Additionally, important information is often
conveyed to consumers through mass advertising. This exchange of
information contributes to the consumer's objective understanding of
the contract.254
In Computerized RadiologicalServices, Inc. v. Syntex Corp.,255 a
group of radiologists purchased a CAT scanner.25 6 In order to close
the deal, the seller promised that, although the current scanner only
screened heads and took 60 seconds to scan, the capability to screen
the entire body in 30 seconds would be available "shortly."'2 57
Although these improvements were not forthcoming, the seller
argued there was no breach of warranty because the one-year warranty against defects provided for in the contract was "expressly in
lieu of all other obligations or liabilities. '2 8 The judge held that the
express warranty promised by the seller survived the disclaimer. The
court stated that "[t]o agree with defendant that its boiler plate language ...bars proof of express warranties made before plaintiff signed

reweave the fabric of the agreement to suit
that form, would be to259
defendant's own ends.

Statements by insurance agents also contribute to the insured's
understanding of the fabric of the agreement. In Harr v. Allstate
Insurance Co. ,260 an applicant for homeowner's and fire insurance
254. For example, one court held that in-state students at the University of New
Hamphshire who received letters informing them of the possibility of mid-semester tuition
increases were bound by a contract term giving the University the right to increase tuition at
any time, while out-of-state students who did not receive the mailing were not so bound:
"Absent notice by the University of the potential increase, a reasonable student would not
have anticipated additional charges for tuition to occur mid-semester." Gamble v. University
Sys. of N.H., 610 A.2d 357, 362 (N.H. 1992).
255. 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
256. The cost of the CAT (Computerized Axial Tomography) Scanner was $347,000. Id. at
1500.
257. Id. at 1501, 1506.
258. Id. at 1506.
259. Id. at 1507; see also U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 1 (1990) (stating that express warranties
"rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that
bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basis of dickered terms.");
Miller v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 62 P.2d 975, 977 (Okla. 1936) (stating that when an
express oral warranty is contradicted by a written disclaimer, the buyer "may relabel his action
as one in fraud and thus escape the parol evidence rule."); Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre,
291 A.2d 858, 863 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1972) ("Where a party permits another to sign a
contract knowing that he is under a misapprehension as to its terms, there is equitable fraud
which warrants reformation or rescission.").
260. 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969).
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sought to include his business merchandise on his policy. Before leaving on a trip, he telephoned his insurance agent and requested coverage for the merchandise. The agent replied, "Mr. Harr, we can cover
you for $7500 and you arefully covered. Go to Florida ...and have a
good time. ' 261 While Mr. Harr was in Florida, disaster struck. Even

though the merchandise was damaged by water from bursting pipes,
which the language of the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage, the court ruled that the agent's statements were part of the
contract:
[W]here an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even though innocently, the coverage of an insurance contract or the exclusions
therefrom, to an insured before or at the inception of the contract,
and the insured reasonably relies thereon to his ultimate detriment,
the insurer is estopped to deny coverage after a loss on a risk or
from a peril actually not covered by the terms of the policy. This
proposition is one of elementary and simple justice. By justifiably
relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the insured has been
prevented from procuring the desired coverage elsewhere. To
reject this approach ...would be an unfortunate triumph of form

over substance.262
The court recognized that this rule will impose new and possibly
unintended risks on the insurer. Nonetheless, that too was equitable
because:
If the insurer is saddled with coverage it may not have intended or
desired, it is of its own making, because of its responsibility for the
acts and representations of its employees and agents. It alone has
the capacity to guard against such a result by the proper selection,
trainingand supervision of its representatives.2 63

Similarly, a seller has the capacity to guard against misrepresentations in its advertisements that raise consumer expectations. In Collins v. Uniroyal,26 tire advertisements provided a guarantee against
blowouts stating, "[i]f it only saves your life once, it's a bargain. ' 265
261. Id. at 212.
262. Id. at 219; see also Brown v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tenn. 1991)
("Technical distinctions, created by the insurer within its field of expertise and exclusive
control, should not dictate the fortunes of innocent insureds who reasonably rely upon the
misrepresentations of agents of the insurer.").
263. Harr, 255 A.2d at 219 (emphasis added); see also Brown, 818 S.W.2d at 13 ("IT]he
insurer is in a better position to minimize the frequency of occasions in which the reasonable
expectations of an insured are not supported by the policy language. By training its agents in
the language of its policies, and by simplifying the policy language itself, the insurer can reduce
the frequency of misrepresentations and increase the difficulty of proving reasonable
reliance."); Peninsular Life Ins. Co. v. Wade, 425 So. 2d 1181, 1183-84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
264. 315 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1974).
265. Id. at 18.
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The estate of a purchaser, who was killed in an accident caused by a
blowout, was permitted to sue for damages despite a contract clause
limiting damages to replacement of the tire.
The court stressed that the tire manufacturer's advertised statements created an objective understanding that the manufacturer was
assuming a far higher responsibility than normal:
The seller should be held to realize that the purchaser of a tire
buying it because so warranted is far more likely to have made his
purchase decision in order to protect himself and the passengers in
his car from death or personal injury in a blowout accident than to
assure himself of a refund of the price of the tire in such an event.
That being the natural reliance and reasonable expectation of the
purchaser flowing from the warranty, it appears to us patently

unconscionable for the manufacturer to be permitted to limit his
damages.

266

Statements made by the consumer prior to contracting are also
relevant to the objective interpretation of form contracts because they
contribute to the seller's understanding of the consumer's knowledge
and purpose. Under the objective theory of form contracts, when a
consumer's statements indicate a particular belief, the seller's silence
can be viewed as acquiescence, regardless of written contractual language to the contrary.
Cases involving film processors' disclaimers of liability are an
example of this principle. Film processors generally limit their liability because "no film processor would expose itself to liability for the
unknown content of film without having to so greatly increase the
cost to the public as to price the service out of the market. 2 6' A
Florida court upheld these limitations, but stressed that the consumer
actually read and understood this clause.
In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court refused to uphold a
similar disclaimer of liability in Mieske v. Bartel Drug Co. 268 A consumer brought in thirty-two movie reels, covering many years of family life, for splicing. She was given a receipt stating, "We assume no
responsibility beyond retail cost of film unless otherwise agreed to in
writing. '2 69 Although unaware of the clause, she said to the store
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. Fotomat Corp. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
268. 593 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1979). A similar result, based on course of dealing, was reached
in Karol v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 414 A.2d 939, 940 (N.H. 1980) (ignoring exclusion of
film processing loss where film-maker asked insurer for "broad coverage" against film
production losses).
269. Mieske, 593 P.2d at 1310.
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manager, "don't lose these. They are my life."'27 After the store lost
the film, the court upheld a jury verdict for $7,500.
This is an appropriate result. The manager knew or should have
known from the consumer's statement that she placed special value
on the film and would hardly be satisfied with receiving twenty-five
rolls of blank film or replacement. Once the manager knew of her
special circumstances from her statements, he had an affirmative duty
to inform her of the disclaimer of liability if he wished to retain the
limitation.27 ' If the manager feared losing the customer's business, he
could have taken special precautions, perhaps for an added charge.
The manager who knew of the special nature of the film, not the customer who was unaware of the liability disclaimer, should suffer for
the manager's silence.
D. Beyond the Realm of Contemplation
When parties negotiate a transaction, they focus on the central
terms, such as price and quantity, and are likely aware of certain
subordinate topics, such as warranty and credit terms. There are certain issues, however, that are so far removed from the purpose of the
deal that they are not within the realm of contemplation of a party
who neither drafted nor read the written contract. Just as one cannot
accept an offer of which one is unaware,272 consumers should not be
held to have objectively assented to such terms.
In Weaver v. American Oil Co. ,273 the Indiana Supreme Court
refused to enforce a term in a lease between an oil company and a
filling station operator that not only held the oil company harmless
for its own negligence, but actually required the operator to indemnify
the oil company for damages caused by the oil company's negligence.
The oil company did not contend that the operator knew of this term,
or that he should have known he was assuming financial responsibility
for the company's negligence. Rather, the company argued that the
unread clause should control. The court refused to enforce the clause
absent explicit agreement by both parties to the term. The court
stated: "We do not mean to say or infer that parties may not make
contracts exculpating one of his negligence and providing for indemnification, but it must be done knowingly and willingly as in insurance
270. Id.
271. Fotomat Corp., 464 So. 2d at 631 ("When the customer is made aware of the provision
for limitation of liability and nevertheless proceeds with the transaction, he has assented to an
agreement for which there is a commercial need ... .
272. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 19, at 73.
273. 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
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contracts made for that purpose."274
A contract's subordinate clause permitting a bank to retain and
use a mortgagor's prepaid interest and tax premiums without paying
interest was struck down for similar reasons in Derenco, Inc. v. Benj.
Franklin FederalSavings and Loan Association.275 The court pointed

out that approving a bank's interest-free use of the mortgagor's
money would result in a "gratuitous windfall" because:
[a]t the time of the making of the contract, there would have been
no reason for borrowers to assume, in the absence of their being
otherwise informed, that [the bank] would have any interest other
than that which was necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
deposits.
[W]hen he is not paid interest nor told that deposited funds
will be put to the institution's use, but instead is told that they will
be put into a reserve account, we believe it is doubtful that he would
expect the money to be used for the benefit of such institution.27 6

Banks have long been relieved of the duty to pay a publicly
announced reward to a samaritan who assists in the capture of a bank
robber when she is unaware of the reward, because there "is no
277
mutual agreement of the minds as is essential to a contract.
There is similarly no mutual agreement of the minds as to contract
provisions beyond the scope of the consumer's contemplation.
Accordingly, form clauses disclaiming a residential landlord's implied
warranty of habitability, 27 8 imposing substantial liquidated damages
274. Id. at 148. Interestingly enough, the court wrestled with the concept of objective, as
opposed to subjective, assent: "The party seeking to enforce such a contract has the burden of
showing that the provisions were explained to the other party and came to his knowledge and
there was in fact a real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective
meeting." Id. at 148.
The court confused the "objective meeting" of the minds with a "legally imposed"
meeting. The latter comes when the courts enforce an unknown clause, even though it was not
contemplated by the consumer, because of a black-letter rule that signed contracts should be
enforced as written. By contrast, the "objective" meeting of the minds over the indemnity
clause never occurred in Weaver, as the court itself noted, because both the filling station
operator was unaware of the term and the oil company knew that the operator's signature
represented "a mere formality." Id. at 146. Although the court thought its holding violated
the objective theory of contracts, in reality the decision enforces the objective understanding of
the non-drafter's intent: "The law should seek the truth or the subjective understanding of the
parties in this more enlightened age. The burden should be on the party submitting ... [the]
printed form to show that the other party had knowledge of any unusual or unconscionable
terms contained therein." Id. at 147.
275. 577 P.2d 477 (Or. 1978).
276. Id. at 488, 490 (emphasis added).
277. Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 99 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. 1907).
278. See, e.g., Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 130 (W. Va. 1978) ("[I]t is fair to presume
that no individual would voluntarily choose to live in a dwelling that-had become unsafe for
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for default on a lease of farm equipment, 279 and permitting a pawnbroker to trespass on a borrower's property and intentionally (and
tortiously) damage property 280 have all been struck down.
The underlying principle is that consumers should "not be intimidated or tricked ... by booby trap clauses hidden away in a printed

form.... "2 8 t The further a form term is from the central purpose of
the contract, the easier it should be for courts to find a lack of objective manifestation of assent by the consumer.
IX. SPECIAL CASES
While the range of possible form contract terms is virtually limitless, there are two areas that warrant special consideration under the
objective theory. In the usual non-negotiated consumer form contract, merger clauses and terms affecting the consumer's access to
courts create an extraordinary risk of defeating the consumer's objective understanding. Moreover, the unexpectedly harsh effect of such
clauses is so contrary to the average consumer's expectations that
enforcement of the clauses may lead to great injustice. Accordingly,
courts reviewing such clauses must take special care to interpret these
clauses under the objective theory of contract.
A.

Merger Clauses

A merger (or integration) clause purports to limit the contractual
agreement to whatever terms appear on the document.2" 2 When
knowingly agreed upon, a merger clause serves to confirm each
party's understanding of their respective obligations and helps courts
in determining the intent of the parties.283
In a typical consumer form contract, an unread merger clause
not only fails to mirror the consumer's intent, but directly contradicts
the understanding created by the merchant because it prevents prior
statements from becoming part of the contract. For example, a salesperson makes a promise to induce the consumer to enter into a contract. The consumer reasonably relies on the statement and signs the
contract. The unread merger clause defeats the consumer's reasonhuman habitation.") (quoting Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1952)); see

also Henroiulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 468-70 (Cal. 1978); Old Town
Development Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 786-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
279. John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574-75 (D. Kan. 1986).
280. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 763 (Tex. 1977).
281. Old Town Development Co., 349 N.E.2d at 785.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
283. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 457-58.

1993]

REUNIFICATION OF CONTRACT

1315

able expectation created by the seller's statements.2"4 Not only is this
unfair, but it also permits sellers to prevail despite their own knowledge of the consumer's reliance on their statements in entering the
contract.
Following the teachings of Professor Corbin,28 5 courts generally
do not enforce consumer form merger clauses.28 6 In the words of the
Washington Supreme Court, "a merger clause will not be enforced
where it does not in fact express the true intentions of the parties. '28 7
For sellers who wish to avoid incorporating statements by their sales
agents into the contract, the remedy is the proper selection, training,
and supervision of sales agents and the adequate informing of
288
consumers.

B. Access to Courts
One broad area that is virtually never contemplated by consumers signing form contracts is the selection of the legal forum and rules
that will govern any future litigation. Consumers do not consider
these matters because: 1) the consumer generally does not foresee the
breakdown of the contract; 2) very few contracts in fact end in litigation; 3) there is no discussion at the time of contract, and certainly no
advertisement, addressing these issues; and 4) many subtle legal issues
are unknown and misunderstood by most laypersons. 289 An unread
term restricting consumers' access to judicial relief in case of breach
of contract cannot be within their objective understanding of the
agreement. Courts must ensure that enforcement of an unbalanced
clause does not make the court itself a party to injustice.
1.

CONFESSIONS OF JUDGMENT

A confession of judgment concedes liability on the part of the
284. Seibel v. Layne & Bowler Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that "it
would be unconscionable to permit an inconspicuous merger clause to exclude evidence of an
express oral warranty").
285. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
286. See, e.g., Central Jersey Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Sightseer Corp., 608 F.2d 1106,

1110 (6th Cir. 1979); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709, 714 (Idaho
1979); Rinaudo v. Bloom, 120 A.2d 184, 189 (Md. 1956); Seibel, 641 P.2d at 671.
287. Berg v. Stromme, 484 P.2d 380, 385 (Wash. 1971).
288. See, e.g., Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208, 219 (N.J. 1969).
289. See John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability,31 U. PiTt. L. REV. 1,
74 (1969) (stating that "the pain and suffering of attempting to read and understand every
printed form would be greater than the pain [suffered] as a result of occasionally being bound
by unread and uncomprehended printed terms"); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract
Law, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75, 133 (1984) ("Because the vast majority of contracts are
successfully completed, a reasonable consumer should pay little attention to the terms of a
contract unless he values the contract highly or is alerted to potential problems.").
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confessor prior to the alleged wrong-doing. The clause binds the
signer to whatever charge the contract drafter chooses to levy,
whether truthful or not. As one court stated:
[T]he confession of judgment clause was the essence of a material,
risk-shifting term. It was designed to summarily discard the due
process guarantees which our system of jurisprudence so highly
cherishes. It is difficult to conceive of a clause which alters risks in
a more drastic fashion than one which dispenses with the signer's
day in court.29 °
The above quote is from a case where a wife signed two notes
confessing judgment for monies her husband had embezzled from his
employer.291 She was told at the signing that she would only be
responsible for $160,000, which she knew her husband would be able
to repay immediately.29 2 After the $160,000 was paid, the employer,
citing the language of the second note, sued the wife for an additional
$21 2,000.293 The court refused to enforce the second note because the
wife
did not understand the terms of the second judgment note. The
harsh allocation of risk was not manifested in a manner reasonably
comprehensible to her. She had never before seen a judgment note
and was crying for part of the time when she read the documents
presented to her, although she tried her best to read them.2 94
Confessions of judgment in form contracts are simply not
expected. Moreover, the results of these terms are extraordinarily
harsh. Without a consumer's knowing and voluntary assent to such
terms, the drafter cannot reasonably believe that the consumer
assented to the clause. As Professor Murray stated:
Perhaps confession of judgment clauses are so pernicious that they
should be declared illegal. In the absence of illegality, however,
the only concern of the court should be whether the party against
whom the clause is supposed to operate knew about it and, once his
apparent assent is manifested, whether he had any choice at all in
relation to it, i.e., whether his apparent assent was genuine. 295
2.

ATrORNEY FEES

Another pernicious clause frequently found in form contracts
requires the consumer to pay the attorney fees of the contract drafter.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 147.
Murray, supra note 289, at 19-20.

19931

REUNIFICATION OF CONTRACT

1317

The requirement to pay the other party's attorney fees for litigation
over the contract, whose obligation has not yet been performed let
alone breached, is not within the consumer's contemplation. Such a
term should never be enforced absent knowing and genuine assent by
the consumer.
Courts have long recognized the harmful effects of such clauses.
In 1892, the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to enforce a
clause in a promissory note stipulating that "in case this note is collected by legal process the usual collection fee shall be due."2 96 The
court stated that "such a provision is a stipulation for a penalty or
forfeiture, tends to the oppression of the debtor and to encourage litigation, is a cover for usury, is without any valid consideration to sup' 297
port it, contrary to public policy, and void.
This tendency to oppress inherent in fee clauses is well-illustrated
by the case in which a New York City landlord, after losing the case,
attempted to collect attorney fees from a tenant.29 8 The court denied
recovery, stating that "[a]n award of counsel fees to a non-prevailing
party would be an absurd and oppressive result. ' 299 The landlord was
also denied attorney fees for the administrative hearings at which he
prevailed. The court stated that "[t]he threat of onerous attorneys'
fees in the event of an adverse determination might well have a chilling effect upon parties taking their grievance to the administrative
body expressly established to adjudicate those grievances.""
Short of simply refusing to enforce form attorney fee clauses, the
New York legislature may have created the best alternative for common law courts. New York State law now requires that where a lease
provides for recovery of legal fees by a prevailing landlord, a tenant
who prevails will also be eligible for attorney fees. 30 1
In a consumer form contract, attorney fee provisions are far from
the contemplation of the non-drafting party. The best response to
such a provision would be to find it unenforceable because of the lack
of objective manifestation of assent.30 2 Alternatively, prevailing con296. Tinsley v. Hoskins, 16 S.E. 325, 325 (N.C. 1892).
297. Id. (quoting Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Sevier, 14 F. 662, 663 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1882)).
298. East 55th St. Joint Venture v. Litchman, 469 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1983),
affld, 487 N.Y.S.2d 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
299. Id. at 1018.
300. 487 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
301. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 234 (McKinney 1989 and 1993 Supp.).
302. One example of an attorney fee clause that was subject to true assent was the promise
by the owners of major league baseball teams to pay for the former baseball commissioner's
attorney fees in case of litigation between the owners and the commissioner. Jim Henneman,
Owners Seem Prepared to Knock Vincent Out of Commission, BALTIMORE MORNING SUN,
Sept. 3, 1992, at D6.
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sumers should be permitted to recover attorney fees whenever prevailing sellers would. Otherwise, intimidation and litigation is
encouraged without gain for true freedom of contract.
3. JURY TRIAL
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the right to a jury trial in civil litigation.30 3 One court stated
that "[t]his is a valuable, cherished right; it is integral to our system of
justice. ' ' 3° While this right can be waived, the relinquishment must
be knowing and voluntary.30 5
Form contracts should not surreptitiously wrest away a right
granted by the framers of the Constitution. As one court stated:
[Drafters] have a very heavy burden of proving that the plaintiffs
knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally agreed upon the jury
waiver provision ....

A constitutional guarantee so fundamental

as the right to jury trial cannot be waived unknowingly by mere
insertion of a waiver provision on the twentieth page of a twentytwo page standardized form contract .... In fact, the defendants
have failed to show that the plaintiffs had any choice other than to
accept the contract as written ....

Absent proof to the contrary,

such an inequality in relative bargaining positions suggests that the
asserted waiver was neither knowing nor intentional. 3"
The Alabama Supreme Court similarly refused to enforce a jury
trial waiver in a form contract between a pharmacist and his
employer, a department store, because "it does not appear that the
waiver.., was intelligently or knowingly made. ' 30 7 An unread form
303. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ....
the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved ....").
304. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982).
305. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
that waiver must be "done knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally"); National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]he Seventh Amendment right to a jury is
fundamental and ... its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and intelligently.").
For a discussion of waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, see Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp.
777, 788 (W.D. Mich. 1975) ("[A] blanket authorization in an adhesion contract that the
College may search the room for violation of whatever substantive regulations the College
chooses to adopt and pursuant to whatever search regulation the College chooses to adopt is
not the type of focused, deliberate, and immediate consent contemplated by the
Constitution."); cf Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (holding unenforceable
contractual provision waiving due process rights when there was "no showing whatever that
the appellants were actually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now
relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights.").
306. Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403 (refusing to enforce a jury trial waiver in a contract
between an automobile manufacturer and a dealer).
307. Gaylord Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 587 (Ala. 1981). The court
described the contract as a "form contract with boiler plate provisions. The jury waiver
provision is buried in paragraph thirty-four in a contract containing forty-six paragraphs ..
"
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contract clause does not evince a knowing and willing waiver of the
Constitutional right to trial by jury. Consequently, courts should be
leary of enforcing such clauses absent concrete objective evidence of
the consumer's assent.
4.

ARBITRATION

Arbitration can be an efficient and economical means for resolving disputes. The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act 30 8 "establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration, requiring

that '[a court] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.' "309 Thus,
the Court has upheld form terms in brokerage contracts that required
arbitration of claims relating to S.E.C. Act violations, 310 antitrust
31 2
laws,3" and RICO suits.
The Supreme Court, however, has not issued an opinion on
unread form arbitration clauses. The Court has not stated that arbitration clauses are more easily enforceable than other contract
clauses, merely that they should not be especially disfavored.3" 3 In a
similar vein, the Court held that the Arbitration Act reflects Congress's intent to make "arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so." 314 Thus, if other unread form contract
Id.; see also Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703, 705 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1992) ("A constitutional guarantee so fundamental as the right to jury trial
cannot be waived unknowingly by mere insertion of a waiver provision on the twentieth page
of a twenty-two page standardized form contract."). A form jury waiver was enforced,
however, when the non-drafter was represented by counsel who read the form prior to signing.
Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
308. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 2 reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
309. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citations
omitted).
310. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
311. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
312. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 242.
313. Absent a well-founded claim that an arbitration agreement resulted from the
sort of fraud or excessive economic power that 'would provide grounds for the
revocation of any contract,' the Arbitration Act 'provides no basis for disfavoring
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable
inquiry into arbitrability.[']
Id. at 226 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
627 (1985)).
314. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). The
Court added that courts were not barred from reviewing whether arbitration clauses were

fraudulently procured, because to "immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge
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clauses are struck down under the objective theory, unread arbitration
clauses should meet a similar fate.
In fact, the Supreme Court seems willing to accept such a contention. In upholding a brokerage form arbitration agreement, the
Court stated, "Although petitioners suggest that the agreement to
arbitrate here was adhesive in nature, the record contains no factual
showing sufficient to support that suggestion. 13

5

The Court did not

say it was irrelevant whether the contract was adhesive, merely that
conclusory statements to that effect are insufficient to attack an arbitration clause. The clear implication is that if such a factual showing
of adhesion had been made, the arbitration clause would have been
treated quite differently.31 6
For example, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a medical
clinic's arbitration clause was unenforceable because the clinic did not
explain it to the patient. 3 7 Relying on the objective theory of contracts, the court stated that the patient "did not give an informed con3 18
sent to the agreement and that no meeting of the minds occurred.
Even if a patient does read an arbitration clause, depending on
the circumstances, the reading alone may not constitute sufficient evidence of a meeting of the minds. Especially when the form is
presented to a patient just before a medical procedure is to begin,
courts should be reluctant to find objective assent.3a 9
on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to elevate it over other forms of contract."
Id.
315. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(emphasis added).
316. While the Court did not say precisely what sort of factual showing would be sufficient,
its appreciation of the problem is apparent. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (stating "courts should remain attuned to wellsupported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any
contract.' ").

317. Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985).
318. Id.; see also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 174 (Cal. 1966) (stating that
arbitration provisions were contrary to the reasonable expectation of the non-drafting party,
absent "plain and clear" notification of the existence of such clauses); Sanchez v. Sirmons, 467
N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) ("In order to be binding, the arbitration provision
should have been called to the petitioner's attention and she should have been given a
reasonable explanation of its meaning and effect, including an explanation of any other
available options."); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 325 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982) (agreement to arbitrate must be made "in an intelligent, knowing and voluntary
manner").
319. It is only the unusual patient who faces surgery without fear and trepidation.
The anxiety produced by thoughts of soon entering the operating room, an
unfamiliar setting, and the ever present possibility of an untoward result, create
an inappropriate atmosphere in which to thrust upon a patient for the first time
the burden of analyzing documents containing an arbitration provision
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Even if arbitration was reasonably expected by the non-drafting
party, 320 neither the arbitration provision nor the arbitration tribunal
must favor the contract drafter. 321 A one-sided arbitration provision
gives only one party the right to demand arbitration. For example, a
physician's contract required that all claims arising from the doctorpatient relationship be arbitrated, except claims for money due for
services rendered.32 2 Because only doctors might have a claim for
payment for their services, the court refused to enforce the arbitration
clause and stated: "An arbitration agreement will not be enforced
unless it is 'mutually binding.' Where an arbitration clause is not
mutually binding, but rather grants one party a unilateral right to
'323
arbitrate, the court will not enforce such agreement.
To be enforceable, an arbitration clause must also place the decision in the hands of an impartial arbiter who is neither personally nor
institutionally biased. The California Supreme Court acknowledged
that contracting parties could agree to select non-neutral arbitrators,
but absent equal bargaining and true consent, required that any arbi'324
tration must meet "minimum levels of integrity.
inconspicuously embodied therein. A patient being wheeled into the operating
room should not have to contemplate the pros and cons of litigating the
surgeon's mistakes before a tribunal of arbitrators rather than before a jury in a
court of law.
Sanchez, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 761; see also Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,
447 (Cal. 1963) ("The admission room of a hospital contains no bargaining table where, as in a
private business transaction, the parties can debate the terms of their contract.").
320. See, e.g., Preston v. Kruezer, 641 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Finkle & Ross
v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hope v. Dean
Witter Reynolds Org., Inc., 226 Cal. Rptr. 439, 445-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
321. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976) (upholding
arbitration clause that "bears equally" on both parties).
322. Miner v. Walden, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
323. Id. at 339; accord Mendes v. Automobile Ins. Co., 563 A.2d 695, 699 (Conn. 1989)
(rejecting clause limiting appeals); Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992)
(striking clause authorizing appeal of only high arbitration awards); Schmidt v. Midwest
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Minn. 1988) (same); Pepin v. American
Universal Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 21, 23 (R.I. 1988) (same); see also Dwyer v. Biddle, 83 N.Y.S.2d
138, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) ("There is no satisfactory showing of a reciprocally
enforceable written contract of the parties containing the claimed arbitration clause.").
324. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981).
[W]e must note that when as here the contract designating such an arbitrator is
the product of circumstances suggestive of adhesion, the possibility of
overreaching by the dominant party looms large; contracts concluded in such
circumstances, then, must be scrutinized with particular care to insure that the
party of lesser bargaining power, in agreeing thereto, is not left in a position
depriving him of any realistic and fair opportunity to prevail in a dispute under
its terms.
Id. Thus, the court refused to order arbitration which would have been conducted by the
union of one of the contracting parties. Id. at 177.
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FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

Contracting parties sometimes try to control the costs of future
litigation by including a term requiring that all litigation be filed in a
designated forum. 325 These forum selection clauses serve to prevent
future conflicts regarding the correct forum and permit a rational
business to consolidate legal action in one locale. a26
The major danger inherent in these clauses is that they can force
consumers to enforce their rights in far removed fora, which may
effectively bar such enforcement. As one court said, such a clause
represents a recurring fantasy of shipowners and cargo defense
lawyers. Ideally, if a choice of forum clause in a bill of lading
would name the place for the resolution of the controversy, for
example, Timbuktu or Byelorussia, then the expense and discomfort of pursuing the matter there would, of course, affect the exercise of the rights of the otherwise innocent cargo owner. Certain
claims, because of the amount involved or other considerations
327
regarding evidence and witnesses would not be pursued.
In ParagonHomes Inc. v. Carter,328 a Maine corporation, doing
home improvements on a house in Brockton, Massachusetts, inserted
into its form contract a clause designating New York as the proper
forum.3 29 The New York courts refused to enforce the clause, stating
that the clause
was inserted by the plaintiff in its printed form of contract for the
purpose of harassing and embarrassing the defendants in the prosecution or defense of any action arising thereunder. This is not a
case involving parties situated on an equal basis .... The procurement of defendants' consent to New York as the forum for legal
redress is . . . without justification, grossly unfair and
unconscionable.3 30
By contrast, the United States Supreme Court upheld a forum
selection clause in a consumer form contract in CarnivalCruise Lines
v. Shute.331 Consumers from the state of Washington had purchased,
through a local travel agent, tickets for a cruise from California to
325. Some courts hold that choice of law clauses should be treated the same as those
designating choice of forum. Sembawang Shipyard, Ltd. v. Charger, Inc., 955 F.2d 983, 986
(5th Cir. 1992).
326. For an excellent discussion of forum selection clauses, see Goldman, supra note 3.
327. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. M/V "Steir", 773 F. Supp. 523, 524 n. 1 (D.P.R.

1991).
328. Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aftd, 295 N.Y.S.2d
606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
329. Id. at 818.
330. Id.
331. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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Mexico. The tickets contained a forum selection clause designating
Florida, the location of the cruise line's corporate headquarters, as the
forum.332 Ms. Shute suffered an injury while sailing in international
waters, and she sued the cruise line in Washington upon her return.
The Supreme Court upheld the forum selection clause, stating that it
had not been inserted into a form contract merely to discourage litigation.333 Instead, the selection of Florida was a good faith selection
given that the cruise line's principal place of business was Florida and
that many of its cruises left from Florida. Moreover, because a ship
carries passengers from many locales, the cruise line might rationally
wish to consolidate all potential claims in a single site.334
One factor limiting the precedential scope of Carnival in future
consumer form cases is that the cause of action occurred in international waters.335 Unlike the situation where consumers purchase
goods for use in their homes, the cruise occurred far from either
party's domicile. The forum selection clause was especially appropriate in that situation "given the fact that Mrs. Shute's accident
occurred off the coast of Mexico-[this dispute was not] an essentially
local one inherently more suited to resolution in the State of Washing'336
ton than in Florida.

The Court also concluded that, even though this was a form contract over which there had been no bargaining, there were no contractual irregularities to defeat enforcement of the term. 337 The Court
deliberately declined to address the most important issue in interpreting form contracts, whether consumers are truly aware of subordinate
provisions of such contracts.
The reason for this omission is that the consumers in their brief
expressly waived any contention that they had not received adequate
notice of the clause: "The respondents do not contest the incorporation of the provision nor that the forum selection clause was reason332. Clause 8 stated:
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and
matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract
shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida,
U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.
Id. at 587-88.
333. Id. at 595.
334. Id.
335. "We begin by noting the boundaries of our inquiry. First, this is a case in admiralty,
and federal law governs the enforceability of the forum-selection clause we scrutinize." Id. at

590.
336. Id. at 594.
337. "Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of
which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have
bargaining parity with the cruise line." Id. at 593.
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ably communicated to the respondents, as much as three pages of fine
print can be communicated. The issue is whether the forum selection
clause should be enforced, not whether Respondents received the
ticket. ' 338 The apparent irony of the phrase "as much as three pages
of fine print can be communicated" was ignored by the Supreme
Court, which took this admission at face value: "[W]e do not address
the question whether respondents had sufficient notice of the forum
clause before entering the contract for passage. Respondents essentially have conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection provision. '' 39 Therefore, the Court explicitly declined to consider the issue
of the adequacy of Carnival Cruise Lines' disclosure of the forum
selection term.
Carnival does not stand for the proposition that mere inclusion
of a term in a form contract amounts to adequate notice. The consumers here conceded notice, and the Supreme Court merely took
them for their word. The district court in Generale Bank v.
Choudhurya4 therefore misread Carnival when it asserted that an
undisclosed form term which "could have been read" was "reasonably communicated" to consumers.3 41 The lower court upheld the
forum selection clause in a promissory note, even though the debtor
argued he did not have notice of the clause. The court stated that the
debtor signed the promissory notes, and that he "could have been
made aware of the forum-selection clause had he read those documents. '3 42 The court erroneously concluded that Carnival mandated
that "[g]iven that the forum-selection clause was 'reasonably communicated' to Choudhury through delivery of the promissory notes
which he signed, Choudhury had constructive notice of that
338. Brief for Respondents at 26, CarnivalCruise Lines (No. 89-1647). This was a tactical
decision [in hindsight, a poor one], as they chose to focus their legal energies on arguing that
the unequal bargaining power was sufficient to defeat enforcement of the forum selection
clause. In fairness, this strategy did work in the Court of Appeals, where the Ninth Circuit
stated: "Even if we assume that the Shutes had notice of the provision, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that the Shutes could have bargained over this language." 897 F.2d 377, 389
(9th Cir. 1990). The appellate court did say this assumption was "doubtful," because the
consumers did not have the opportunity to review the terms until mailed to them, id. at 389
n. 11, but proceeded on this "doubtful" contention anyway.
339. 499 U.S. at 590. The admission of having read the contract was counter-factual, as
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that "only the most meticulous passenger is likely to become
aware of the forum selection provision." Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The term was
included as the eighth of twenty-five numbered paragraphs, on a form which was not delivered
until consumers had already purchased their ticket, and which barred refunds for those who
wished to get out of the deal. Id.
340. 779 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
341. Id. at 305 n.l.
342. Id. at 305.
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clause." 343
The Supreme Court did not adopt the principle of "constructive
notice." The significance of Carnivalfor determining the enforceability of form terms in general is far more narrow. The Court stressed
that its holding should be read in light of two limiting facts: the nonlocal nature of the dispute and the fact that the consumers did "not
claim lack of notice of the forum clause." 3" Therefore, as in the arbitration cases, 345 the Supreme Court has indicated that cases by consumers who were unaware of specific form terms are distinguishable
from cases where consumers admit notice. Before enforcing an
unread form forum-selection clause, courts should apply the objective
theory of contract and insist on a showing that the consumer was
aware of the clause and its effects.
One pre-Carnival court explicitly referred to this concept in
refusing to enforce a forum selection clause in a farmer's lease of
water drilling equipment. 346 The court transferred the case to Washington, where the transaction had occurred, despite the clause selecting New York as the forum and stated "[t]here was absolutely
nothing about these transactions which could alert reasonable persons
that disputes arising out of the agreements would be adjudicated
3,000 miles away in New York. ' 347 In a particularly appropriate
application of the objective theory, the court stated: "[i]f the finder of
fact determines that [the non-drafter] did not know of the lease's provisions, and that they were not brought to his attention,.., he might
not be bound by those provisions to which he did not assent-i.e. on
which the parties' minds did not meet. 348
X.

CONCLUSION

The classical common law presumption that consumers read
form contracts has led both to injustice and to an irrational bifurcation of contract law. Modem courts have attempted to correct this
misstep by adhering to the fundamental principle that a consumer's
assent to a contract should be determined by how a reasonable person
343. Id. (footnotes omitted).

344. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the Court again
stressed the consumer's concession: "Finally, respondents have conceded that they were given
notice of the forum provision and, therefore, presumably retained the option of rejecting the
contract with impunity." Id.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16.
346. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
347. Id. at 369.
348. Id. at 366 n.3 (emphasis added).
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in the other party's position would ascertain the consumer's intent as
manifested through words and deeds.
Accordingly, we can now see the outline of the objective theory
of consumer form contracts. Courts no longer assume that the
unknown subordinate written terms are automatically assented to
merely because they are included in an executed contract. Rather,
courts should examine both what the consumer actually knew and
what knowledge is properly attributable to the consumer.
Courts applying the objective theory should examine what contract terms were actually negotiated or explained. Next, courts must
explore the purpose for which the product or service is being
acquired, the legitimate purposes for which subordinate clauses were
included, the content of the communication between the consumer
and the salesperson, and the effect of mass advertisements. Finally,
courts must consider which topics were likely beyond the scope of the
consumer's contemplation.
This correction of a misdirected common law rule is consistent
with the role of common law courts. As Benjamin Cardozo
explained:
A rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves,
and was supposed in the making to express the mores of the day,
may be abrogated by the courts when the mores have so changed
that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to the social conscience .... This is not usurpation. It is not even innovation. It is

the reservation for ourselves of the same power of creation that
built up the common law through its exercise by the judges of the
past.349
The creation of a new rule for form contracts is at hand. If accurately applied, the objective theory will both end the unnatural
growth of divergent contractual theories and permit true freedom of
contract.
349. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Growth of the Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE 185, 246 (Margaret E. Hall

ed., 1947).
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APPENDIX
KARL LLEWELLYN'S UNPUBLISHED 1941 FIRST DRAFT OF
REVISION TO THE UNIFORM SALES ACT: (section on

form contracts)
SECTION 1-C. (New to Sales Act.) DECLARATION OF POLICY,
AND PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO DISPLACEMENT OF
SINGLE PROVISIONS OR GROUPS OF
PROVISIONS BY AGREEMENT.

(1) (a) The principles declared in this Act represent a fair and balanced allocation of rights and liabilities between parties to sales and
contracts to sell, as such allocation has been developed out of the best
case-law and mercantile practice to cover each point to which the two
parties have not directed their careful and deliberate attention.
(b) When both the parties have so directed their attention to a
particular point that the coverage of that point in a manner in addition to or at variance from this Act may fairly be regarded as the
deliberate desire of both, and as reflecting a considered bargain on
that particular point, the provision of the contract on that point is
called in this Act a "particularized term of the bargain"; and the legislature recognizes that policy in general requires the parties' particular
bargain to control. Wherever a provision of the Act is not subject to
such modification by agreement, or is subject to such modification
only within stated limits, that fact is expressly stated in the Act.
(c) The legislature also recognizes that particular trades and situations often require extensive special regulation in a manner departing from the general provisions of this Act, and that speed and
convenience in transacting business may require such extensive departures to be incorporated into a general form-contract, or into "rules"
to which particular transactions are made subject, although the
details of such "rules" or forms are not so deliberated on and bargained about by the two parties when they are closing an individual
transaction as to become particularized terms of the bargain.
(d) On the other hand, the legislature recognizes that where a
group or bloc of provisions are not studied and bargained about in
detail by both parties, then actual assent to the incorporation of such
a group or bloc into a particular transaction is not in fact to be
assumed where the group or bloc of provisions, taken as a whole, allocates rights and obligations in an unreasonably unfair and unbalanced
fashion. The legislature recognizes that assent, without deliberation
and bargaining, to the incorporation into a transaction of a group or
bloc of provisions varying from the general law rests upon the presup-
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position that such a group or bloc of provisions will prove to be a
reasonably fair and balanced one; and the legislature recognizes that
this holds true in fact, whether or not such a group or bloc of provisions are printed upon the contract-form used, and whether or not a
formal recital of acceptance of such a group or bloc of provisions is
found thereon.
(e) The policy of the legislature is to aid and foster any considered and deliberate action to the parties, or of representatives of the
parties' interests, in substituting for the general rules of this Act a fair
and balanced set of provisions more particularly fitted to the needs of
any particular trade or type of situation. The policy of the legislature
is also to avoid any seeming portion of a bargain which does not truly
represent bargaining, but under which one party seeks to displace the
rules of this Act without particular deliberation and bargaining over
each clause, in favor of a set of provisions which lack reasonable balance and fairness in their allocation of rights and obligations.
(2) (a) It is therefore the declared policy of the legislature that where
a number of points purport to be covered in bloc by -a transaction, as
by a form-contract, or by reference to a set of "rules", and a number
of the provisions concerned are at variance with the provisions of this
Act, then the circumstances of the case shall determine whether the
bloc of provisions is or is not substituted as such for the provisions of
the Act. It is the declared policy that the court shall examine the bloc
of provisions in the light of the situation.
(i) If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to work
a displacement or modification of the provisions of this Act
in an unfair and unbalanced fashion not required by the circumstances of the trade, then the party claiming application
of any particular provision in such bloc must show that the
other party, with due knowledge of the contents of that particular provision, intended that provision to displace or
modify the relevant provision of this Act in regard to the
particular transaction.
(ii) If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to
work a fair and balanced allocation of rights and duties in
view of the circumstances of the trade, its incorporation into
the particularized terms of the bargain is presumed from the
presence of the bloc of provisions or of a clear incorporation
thereof on the document of contract.
(iii) If no affirmative showing is made either way, then
the whole bloc of provisions may be incorporated into the
transaction by any circumstance which would justify treat-
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ing a single provision as one of the particularized terms of
the bargain.
(b) The question under this subsection is for the court [or for a
special merchants' jury under Section 51-C.]
(c) In weighing fair balance and in weighing particular intention,
the court may properly consider the circumstances of preparation of
any contract-form, or set of "rules", and, in particular
(i) whether both buyers and sellers of the type involved
in the particular transaction have had a voice in such preparation; and
(ii) whether the displacement of provisions of this Act
sought by the form or "rules" as a whole runs disproportionately in favor of one party as against the other.
(iii) whether clauses sought to be substituted for provisions of this Act are in consonance with fair expectation, in
the light of the circumstances of the trade.

COMMENT ON SECTION

A.

1-C.

General.

This section undertakes to clarify one of the most confused situations in the law of the field, while doing justice to each line of known
need.
(1) The balanced "'Association" type of "Rules". General provisions in an Act cannot do particular justice to the particular conditions of the wholesale trade in grain, or furs, or dried fruit, or fresh
produce. What general provisions can do, is to leave usage of trade
free to modify or displace the general provisions. But proof of usage
of trade, especially before a jury, is expensive and uncertain. Even
before a jury of merchants, the results of proof of such usage of trade
must abide the event, and some upsets are inevitable. Moreover,
usage may be unclear, or in process of change, or different as between
the market the seller knows and the market familiar to the buyer. It
is, therefore, wisdom for those engaged in a particular trade to get
together on a clear and specialized articulate statement in advance of
such usages or changes in usage as they wish incorporated into their
transactions. This the section recognizes and seeks to encourage.
(2) The 'ug-handled" type of "Rules" orform. A private codification, however, has dangers. It may heap all the advantages sought
on one side, and heap all the burdens on the other. And this has
proved true not only of many form-contracts prepared by single sell-
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ers (or buyers), but also of "rules" prepared by groups, when it happened that the interests or thinking of the group ran predominantly to
one single side of the sales transaction.
(3) The principle offreedom of bargain is a principle of freedom
of intended bargain. It requires what the parties' have bargained out
to stand as the parties have shaped it, subject only to certain overriding rules of public policy. "Written" bargains, in the days when the
rules about them crystallized, were bargains whose detailed terms the
two parties had looked over; and the rule was proper, that a signature
meant agreement. When, however, parties bargain today, they think
and talk of such matters as price, credit, date of delivery, description
and quantity. These are the bargained terms. The unmentioned
background is assumed without mention to be the fair and balanced
general law and the fair and balanced usage of the particular trade.
Displacement of these balanced backgrounds is not to be assumed as
intended unless deliberate intent is shown that they shall be displaced;
and deliberate intent is not shown by a lop-sided form whose very
content suggests that it has not been carefully read, and the circumstances of whose execution suggest that the matters under discussion
and consideration were only the matters written or typed in.
(4) The courts have groped for a guide through these two situations, being bothered by an assumed need for a single rule which
would either include even the most lop-sided form, or else would
exclude even the fairest one, when the parties had not given particular
and deliberate attention to its incorporation. Some of the earlier cases
in which lop-sided forms produced shock were dealt with in part on
principles of public utilities (the clauses freeing the railroad from its
own negligence, or limiting the telegraph company's liability; the baggage-check clauses). More recently, in addition to sometimes strained
construction "against the party preparing the document", court after
court has given expression to the desire for balance by requiring, over
and above what is needed to make out consideration, some type of
further "mutuality" in the expressed obligation.
(5) The true principle is clear enough: the expression of a body
of fair and balanced usage is a great convenience, a gain in clarity and
certainty, an overcoming of the difficulty faced by the law in regulating the multitude of different trades; on the other hand, the substitution of private rule-making by one party, in his own interest, for the
balance provided by the law, is not to be recognized without strong
reason shown. This is the result in accordance with which the best
case-law has moved, in many individual cases, but without the coherent general formulation here provided.
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(6) The one-sided group of clauses which arefair, but are needed
to give protection against bad law.
Many groups of clauses in very frequent use in the Sales field are
utterly one-sided, but are, for all that, entirely fair because they correct in a reasonable way an unfortunate condition of the law. The
most frequent of these are seller's clauses protecting against various
types of business impossibility, and protecting against the obligation
of delivery on credit to a buyer who has become a dubious risk. Such
groups of clauses give no difficulty under the present Act, however;
for the Act explicitly recognizes the impossibility clauses and provides
the requisite balance to them in Section 50; and it explicitly recognizes
the propriety of either party's desire for security against uncertainty
of performance, in Section 45. In addition, any coverage by contract
which appeals to the court as producing reasonable balance in matters
not covered by the Act-such as, for instance, reasonable priority or
rationing provisions in regard to outstanding commitments-would
require to be regarded as pro tanto crystallizations of entirely reasonable trade practice or need. See paragraph2 (c) (iii).
(7) Will such a provision produce uncertainty in the construction
of contracts in Sales transactions?
There are two compelling reasons for the conviction that such a
provision will not produce uncertainty in the construction of Sales
transactions.
(a) It will not produce uncertainty, because there is uncertainty.
It is at the present moment impossible to tell what a court will do
with a contested provision in a lop-sided Sales contract. Draftsmen
have to draft on a gamble.
(b) It will lessen the existing uncertainty, because it gives the
draftsman a reasonable guidance as to what he may reasonably expect
to sustain, and gives the court a reasonable guidance through the confused and conflicting precedents.
In addition, the provision may fairly be hoped, over the years, to
lessen uncertainty not only in court, but in transactions, by encouraging the reduction of trade usage to written form. But the case for the
provision stands not on this, but on the bewildering uncertainty which
exists today as to when a court will read one-party language as it is
written, and when it will find a way to avoid such language.
B. Detail.
(1) Legislative Finding of Fact and Declaration of Policy.
(a) The finding of fact and declaration of policy are,
historically, almost an inherent part of statutes; their desue-
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tude for a period was due in good part to their abuse. But
when not abused, they have peculiar value.
(b) For from the technical standpoint they are inherent
in a statute. It is humanly impossible to construe a statute
without envisaging some situation to which the statute is
conceived to be addressed; and it is also humanly impossible
without envisaging a purpose or a set of purposes toward
which the statute is directed.
The situation and the purposes thus have to be set up,
either by the legislature or by the court. If they are left to be
gathered by the court as best it can gather or imagine them,
different courts are likely to see them differently. Both the
need for uniformity and the need for clarity urge that the
situation and the purposes be stated with care, to guide all
lawyers and courts alike.
No less is the general relation between the Act and sets of special
rules which purport to displace it the proper subject of a general declaration of policy. The matter turns on the entire situation and the
entire purpose of the Act. All but a few of the individual sections and
sub-sections are subject as of course to be displaced one by one, by
specific bargain; the question here goes to the displacement of the
whole balanced background of all specific bargain, and the substitution therefor of another whole background. Only a declaration of policy can make reasonably clear what kind of substitution of
background the Act seeks to encourage, and what kind it seeks to
discourage.
(2) Question for the court. The total estimate of the effect of a
body of provisions, in terms of balance, is a job for which a court is
peculiarly fitted. The question of whether the provisions fit the circumstances of a particular trade is one which a special merchants'
jury can best judge, under Section 51-C. But the merchant runs some
risk of accepting a provision merely as it is written because it is so
written; and he has little training in sizing up a transaction from both
ends at once, to reach a view of balance. As against this stands the
fact that the issue to be tried is the issue of balance; and given that
focus of attention, the merchants' jury would seem an adequate
tribunal.
But many cases, under the section, would be wholly for the court;
notably purchases by consumers of articles commonly bought on
complex forms. And if the policy of the section be approved, it may
need explicit extension to cover contracts companioning the sales con-
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tract, as in the case of the sometimes startling purchase-money
mortgages.
(3) Constitutionality. There are a number of reasons for feeling
that no constitutional questions are involved in this section.
(a) Severe legislative restriction on minimum terms of
particular types of transaction, where abuses have appeared,
are familiar, and constitutional. Standard insurance policies
are one instance; the Wisconsin statute on warranty and
remedy in sales of farm machinery is another.
(b) The section is built in terms of testing the reality of
consent, not in terms of limiting freedom of contract. Reality of consent has always been subject to testing by appropriate legal measures. The measures of the section are
appropriate and reasonable, fit the facts of life, and show
their theory on their face.
(c) The section builds a way through a confusion of
case-law which itself leaves little doubt that Courts would
welcome a clue to combining certainty and justice in these
cases. Legislation felt by courts to be helpful in the work of
the courts is very rarely held unconstitutional.

